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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background
The terrorist events of 9/11 highlighted the need for transportation agencies to
reconsider their level of preparedness to respond adequately to large-scale incidents.
Up to that point, highway emergency response was considered as a local issue and
concentrated mainly on natural disasters (AASHTO, 2002a). Departments of
Transportation had different stages of preparedness, depending on the levels and
types of risks considered, on a region by region basis. In this way, the level of
preparedness for response to large scale incidents varied between State DOTs, and
depended on the level of risk and the type of potential threats faced by each
particular state (Ham, 2004). For the purpose of this research, “emergency
response” will be considered as the short-term actions taken immediately after an
incident (AASHTO, 2002a).
A basic premise to consider when approaching DOT emergency response is the
fact that State DOTs are not lead emergency management players (AASHTO,
2002a). Emergency management is usually a coordinated effort among several
Federal, state, local, and private organizations. Each agency is assigned specific
functions to perform when responding to an incident. A State DOT is merely one
such organization. The responsibilities assigned and the functions State DOTs are
expected to perform are assigned in state emergency management plans, following
the four components of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery. However, the means to accomplish each one of these tasks
rely on each State DOT’s level of preparedness. In this way, prior to 9/11, many
State DOTs had developed and implemented Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs)
that established all provisions and procedures to follow internally within the state
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DOT, as a way to ensure the functions assigned by state emergency management
plans were performed efficiently and effectively.
Prior to 9/11, terrorism was considered as a type of emergency, and many state
emergency management plans had annexes that addressed special requirements to
be faced when responding to terrorist incidents. However, few State DOTs had
addressed security or considered terrorism in their internal EOPs and procedures
(Ham, 2004).
The events of 9/11 raised the level of awareness and highlighted the need to
review and revise existing emergency management practices to include the
possibility of large scale terrorist incidents, which may involve the use of Weapons of
Mass Destruction (WMD), occurring within US territory. Pre-9/11 DOT emergency
response provisions that may have proven to be appropriate for natural disasters
may not be adequate within the new terrorist emergency management framework.
Potential large-scale terrorist incidents may bring characteristics that may be quite
different from that of conventional emergencies (AASHTO, 2002a).

TABLE 1.1 – Similarities and Differences Between Terrorist and Other
Emergencies (AASHTO, 2002a)
Similarities
• Mass
casualties
• Damage to
infrastructure
• With or
without
warning
• Evacuation or

Differences
• Caused by people on purpose
• Will always be treated as crime scenes
• May not be immediately recognizable as terrorist incidents.
• May not be single incidents
• Place responders at higher risk due to WMD and possible planned
secondary incidents
• May result in widespread contamination of critical equipment and facilities
• May have delayed or long-lasting effect

displacement

• May expand geometrically in scope

of citizens

• May cause strong public reaction
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Table 1.1 shows some of the similarities and differences between terrorist
emergencies and other large-scale events that necessitate modifications to pre-9/11
emergency plans and procedures. As a result, the response practices in place by
many state DOTs for natural disasters and other significant emergencies may require
important changes when considering response to a terrorist attack. Table 1.2
presents some of the modifications in emergency response as outlined by AASHTO
(2002a).

1.2 Problem Statement
The Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) is one of several Indiana
agencies that are required to provide support to emergency response efforts for
large-scale incidents as required by the Indiana Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan (CEMP). In addition, large-scale emergencies, including terrorist
incidents, will always affect the transportation system in some way (AASHTO, 2002a;
ITE and FHWA, 2004). Transportation systems can be the target of the attacks due
to their importance to the economy. They can also be used as the weapon for
perpetrating the attacks, as was the case in the attacks of 9/11. In addition,
transportation systems are required to provide proper mobility in the case that
evacuation is required, even if the transportation system itself has been affected.
Finally, the transportation system is also the means for response personnel to
quickly reach the incident site and handle the emergency. In conclusion, there is
never a more important time for the transportation system to work at its fullest
capability than in the event of an emergency (ITE and FHWA, 2004).
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TABLE 1.2 – Characteristics of a Terrorist Incident and Possible Changes in
Response (AASHTO, 2002a)
Possible Characteristics of

Possible Change in Response

Terrorist Incident
Caused by people on purpose

Law enforcement and national security agencies will play a larger
role in a terrorist incident. Coordination and understanding of
respective agency roles will be critical. DOT personnel will need to
understand the different relationships inherent during or after a
terrorist incident.

Will always be treated as

Law enforcement agencies will want to control and preserve certain

crime scenes

elements of the crime scene, which may affect response by other
agencies. DOT personnel need to understand how to effectively
work with law enforcement agencies.

May not be immediately

If an incident occurs on or near a highway, DOT personnel may be

recognizable as terrorist

first or early responders. Basic training in identifying signs and

incidents

consequences for early recognition of terrorist incidents is needed
to take appropriate safety precautions.

May not be single incidents

Consider the possibility of additional terrorist incidents as they
respond to an earlier incident(s). DOT personnel need to be trained
to consider risks of secondary terrorist incidents

Place responders at higher

Responders may be the actual target of secondary incidents.

risk due to WMD and possible
planned secondary incidents
May result in widespread

Geographic areas may need to be quickly closed to all but

contamination of critical

designated emergency response personnel. Some resources may

equipment and facilities

become unavailable for use if contaminated. If a highway or related
facility becomes contaminated, some DOT personnel will need to
know how to operate in that contaminated environment.

May have delayed or long-

Response resources may be required far beyond those originally

lasting effect

anticipated. DOT response resources need to be available but may
also need to be protected as the consequences spread.

May expand geometrically in

Same as above.

scope
May cause strong public

A comprehensive public information strategy is necessary. Where

reaction

highways are concerned, state DOT personnel will be expected to
provide information, e.g., through variable message signs, to
motorists evacuating the area.
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INDOT’s emergency operations are performed today based on having developed
relationships with key individuals in other agencies (e.g., ISP, DNR, SEMA). Based
on prior experience, INDOT personnel know what to do and whom to contact,
depending on the type of event. Even though this practice may have proved to be
effective for INDOT in dealing with common incidents (USDOT, 2003), the new
terrorist framework in emergency management and the potential threat of incidents
involving WMD pose a significant challenge and may require revising current
procedures and developing new practices. For these types of events, agencies with
no previous relationship may have to work closely with INDOT, and this new
relationship might have to be formed in the wake of a catastrophe. Clearly, this is
neither convenient nor desirable. Furthermore, normal contacts within INDOT, as
well as those outside the agency, may not be available during an incident, and this
has to be accounted for beforehand.
The new terrorist threat on the Nation creates the need for INDOT to review,
revise, and update its emergency response capabilities to ensure they are adequate
enough in this new operational environment. A wealth of information on
transportation security has been produced by public and private organizations that
address the new issues transportation agencies need to consider to review and
update their emergency response procedures. In addition, Federal initiatives like the
National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS)
have to be considered by INDOT to ensure its response procedures are integrated
within the larger national and state emergency management framework of
operations.
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1.3 Research Objectives
The current research focuses on developing a blueprint for INDOT as a guide of
best practices for developing Highway Emergency Response Plans. The specific
objectives of this research include:
•

Summarize the growing literature on transportation security as it pertains to
INDOT, to serve as reference for future INDOT transportation security and
emergency response efforts, including the development of an INDOT EOP.

•

Identify and review current best practices implemented across the country
that will help INDOT in future security-related initiatives.

•

Develop a set of guidelines to enhance INDOT’s emergency response
capabilities in the new terrorist framework of operations.

•

Develop a set of guidelines for the development of a Highway Emergency
Operations Plan for INDOT.

1.4 Organization of the Report
The following report consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 establishes the motivation
of the research, the general background of the project, and presents the research
objectives. Chapter 2 is a review of Federal homeland security measures undertaken
to enhance emergency management in the US, including the Homeland Security
Advisory System, the National Incident Management System, and the National
Response Plan. Chapter 3 is an overview of emergency management in the State of
Indiana, which will serve as a way for INDOT to understand its role in the State
emergency management framework of operations. Included in this chapter is also a
review of INDOT’s current emergency response capabilities as observed in the
development of this project. Presented in Chapter 4 is a review of what the research
team identified as best practices in emergency response as applicable to INDOT.
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Chapter 5 presents a set of guidelines for the development of an INDOT EOP,
including some general considerations, the application of the Incident Command
System to INDOT as an organizational system for emergency response, and a
proposed structure of an EOP that will serve as a reference for the future
development of an INDOT EOP. Finally, Chapter 6 presents a set of conclusions and
outlines recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 2 - FEDERAL HOMELAND SECURITY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT MEASURES

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland
Security, with three basic objectives (DHS, 2004d): prevent terrorist attacks within
the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.
Several initiatives have been taken since then to protect America from future
terrorist attacks. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 3 (Bush, 2003a) and 5
(Bush, 2003b) dictated some of the most ambitious measures that changed
emergency management as established before 9/11. This chapter presents some of
the most important initiatives of the Federal government, focusing on those that
have affected and will affect the entire emergency management effort in the US.

2.1 Homeland Security Advisory System
The use of advisory systems to centralize and disseminate risk and threat level
information has been a common practice of emergency management organizations
for decades. Advisory systems not only serve as an efficient way to communicate
different risk levels to and among departments and agencies, but are also an
effective way to reach the general public.
The new terrorist threat after the attacks of 9/11 highlighted the need to
establish a centralized mechanism to communicate homeland security threat levels
to the Nation. With this in mind, Homeland Security Presidential Directive–3 (Bush,
2003a) established the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) on March 2002.
All Federal departments and agencies are required to adopt the HSAS as their
primary threat advisory system. All other existing threat systems must conform to

8

the HSAS and should be modified accordingly to function under this new system
(Bush, 2003a).
The HSAS consists of a series of five-color coded threat levels each corresponding
to a specific level of risk, as shown in Figure 2.1. The higher the threat level, the
higher the risk from terrorist attacks. Each of these levels has a set of Protective
Measures to be adopted by all Federal departments and agencies. Figure 2.1
summarizes the threat level conditions and the set of Protective Measures
determined in the HSAS.
Protective Measures established for a certain threat level must also include those
of the lower threat levels. For example, Protective Measures for threat level yellow
must include those for that threat level as well as those specified for blue and green.
In addition, each individual department or agency must identify all additional
protective measures it considers necessary to complement those established in the
HSAS.
The declaration of each of the threat conditions is performed by the Attorney
General in consultation with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
the Homeland Security Council Principals based on intelligence information, and can
be made for the entire Nation or for a specific geographic area or industrial sector
(Bush, 2003a). For example, in August 2004 the threat level was raised from yellow
to orange for the financial sector in New York City, northern New Jersey, and
Washington D.C., remaining yellow for the rest of the country.
Although the HSAS is directed towards Federal departments and agencies,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 encourages State and local entities to
adopt the HSAS and implement their own specific Protective Measures as considered
appropriate following the threat level established. This enhances interoperability and
improves coordination among organizations involved in emergency management. An
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Threat Condition

Description
1.

Severe Condition
RED

2.

Declared when there is a
severe risk of terrorist
attacks.

3.
4.
1.

High Condition

Declared when there is a
high risk of terrorist attacks

ORANGE

2.
3.
4.
1.
2.

Elevated Condition
YELLOW

Declared when there is a
significant risk of terrorist
attacks

3.

4.
1.
Guarded Condition
BLUE

Declared when there is a
general risk of terrorist
attacks.

2.
3.
1.
2.

Low Condition
Green

Declared when there is a low
risk of terrorist attacks.

3.

Protective Measures
Increasing or redirecting personnel to
address critical emergency needs.
Assigning emergency response personnel
and pre-positioning and mobilizing specially
trained teams or resources.
Monitoring, redirecting, or constraining
transportation systems.
Closing public and government facilities
Coordinating necessary security efforts with
Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies or any National Guard or other
appropriate armed forces organizations.
Taking additional precautions at public
events and possibly considering alternative
venues or even cancellation.
Preparing to execute contingency
procedures, such as moving to an alternate
site or dispersing their workforce
Restricting threatened facility access to
essential personnel only.
Increasing surveillance of critical locations.
Coordinating emergency plans as
appropriate with nearby jurisdictions.
Assessing whether the precise
characteristics of the threat require the
further refinement of preplanned Protective
Measures.
Implementing, as appropriate, contingency
and emergency response plans.
Checking communications with designated
emergency response or command locations.
Reviewing and updating emergency
response procedures.
Providing the public with any information
that would strengthen its ability to act
appropriately.
Refining and exercising as appropriate
preplanned Protective Measures.
Ensuring personnel receive proper training
on the Homeland Security Advisory System
and specific preplanned department or
agency Protective Measures.
Institutionalizing a process to assure that all
facilities and regulated sectors are regularly
assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist
attacks, and all reasonable measures are
taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

Figure 2.1 – Homeland Security Advisory System
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example of this is the Federal Transit Administration. The FTA has developed a
National Transit Response Model (FTA, 2004), an applied version of the HSAS that is
specifically directed towards the transit industry. The model is a guide with
recommendations to transit companies on particular measures to adopt in each one
of the threat levels of the HSAS.

2.2 National Incident Management System –NIMS
In an effort to standardize emergency management in the United States,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 (HSPD-5) directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a National Incident Management System (NIMS). This
system was to incorporate a set of concepts, principles and guidelines to be
implemented by all Federal, State, and local agencies involved in emergency
management, based on best practices from diverse incident management disciplines
across the country. The purpose of the NIMS was to provide a consistent nationwide
approach for all entities involved to work effectively and efficiently together to
prepare for, respond to, and recover from potential incidents (Bush, 2003b).
On March 1, 2004 the DHS released the National Incident Management System
(NIMS). The purpose of the NIMS is to standardize emergency management
practices across the US in order to assure interoperability and consistency between
Federal, State, and local entities involved in emergency response. It was developed
in collaboration with emergency management professionals and agencies from
diverse fields, and incorporates some of the best practices and principles found in the
country today.
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Until the NIMS was released, there was no real national standard for emergency
management that covered all departments and agencies with incident management
responsibilities. The events of 9/11 highlighted the need for such standards, to
ensure that all parties would use the same guiding principles when working together
during a disaster. This would enhance the level of preparedness and response
capability of emergency agencies across the US.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 5 (HSPD-5) requires all Federal
departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS and to incorporate it in their internal
incident management activities, as well as to assist State and local entities during a
disaster. It also requests that all State and local agencies adopt the NIMS as a
requirement for Federal preparedness assistance beginning in FY 2005. To assist this
process of adopting NIMS principles to current emergency management capabilities,
the NIMS Integration Center was created by the DHS. The NIMS Integration Center
serves as the focal point of all information regarding this new set of standards,
including the development of a national program for education and awareness.
The NIMS defines five basic components that compose the national framework for
incident management. Each component includes principles and specific mechanisms
that should be implemented by emergency organizations once the NIMS is fully
implemented. These five components are:
1. Command and management
2. Preparedness
3. Resource management
4. Communications and information management
5. Supporting technologies

12

2.2.1 Command and Management
The Command and Management component is build upon three basic systems:
Incident Command Systems, Multiagency Coordination Systems, and Public
Information Systems. ICS and Multiagency Coordination Systems refer to different
incident management levels that are activated according to the nature of the event.
Public Information Systems, on the other hand, include all the principles, procedures,
and processes needed to inform the public appropriately about a large scale incident.
The Incident Command System presented in the NIMS is based on the usual ICS
concept used by emergency response professionals for incident management. A
more detailed description of the ICS is presented in Section 4.1. The NIMS restates
the ICS as the best practice for organizing emergency management at the incident
and establishes it as the national standard structure for incident response. Adoption
of the ICS by organizations with emergency responsibilities is also the initial
requirement for NIMS compliance.
The Multiagency Coordination Systems on the other hand refer to those systems
in which resources are integrated into a common organizational unit for overall
emergency coordination. Multiagency Coordination Systems include Emergency
Operations Centers (EOC) and Multiagency Coordination Entities. Emergency
Operation Centers are defined by the NIMS as the physical locations at which
coordination of information and resources take place during incident management
operations. Multiagency Coordination Entities refer to those organizations established
to provide overall guidance and policy coordination. These are especially appropriate
in events that involve multiple agencies of multiple jurisdictions in which an overall
coordination of activities is required.
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2.2.2 Preparedness
The NIMS establishes the need for individual components with emergency
involvement to acquire a certain level of preparedness as a way to secure proper
incident management operations. All preparedness initiatives in the NIMS are
directed towards ensuring integration and interoperability, as well as coordination
among the different public and private organizations involved in an incident. These
initiatives are grouped into two basic elements: preparedness organizations and
preparedness programs.
Any type of group established to design, coordinate, and conduct preparedness
activities is defined in the NIMS as a Preparedness Organization. These
organizations, whether committees, planning groups, or any other kind of
corporation, should meet regularly to establish priorities and coordinate
preparedness efforts following the specific needs of the jurisdiction in question.
Following NIMS, tasks assigned to Preparedness Organizations include the
development and coordination of emergency plans, the integration and coordination
of activities among the different parties for interoperability, and establishing
priorities for resources that may be required, among others.
The NIMS also outlines a number of initiatives and principles required to ensure
incident management preparedness. These initiatives, referred to as Preparedness
Programs, include planning, training and exercises, personnel qualification and
certification, equipment certification, and mutual-aid agreements. Preparedness
programs should follow NIMS standards and protocols as appropriate to ensure
proper interoperability when applied to incident response. For completeness of this
document, it is important to briefly state the requirements and principles outlined for
each one of these.
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All planning efforts in emergency management rely on a number of plans as their
core of operations. These plans allow emergency responders to establish a set of
guidelines and conventions for operations, prior to the event ever happening. The
NIMS states that all emergency plans should be focused on being able to set
priorities, integrate all entities and functions involved by establishing relationships,
and ensure that all communications systems are properly established (DHS, 2004b).
It identifies five different types of plans to be developed by jurisdictions: Emergency
Operations Plans (EOPs), procedures, preparedness plans, corrective action and
mitigation plans, and recovery plans.
EOPs are plans that describe how a specific jurisdiction will respond to an
incident, including its organizational structures for emergencies (FEMA, 2004).
Procedures plans on the other hand must include all critical information in detail that
is needed for emergency response within a jurisdiction, including mechanisms for
specific tasks such as notification to appropriate staff, communications operating
instructions, and mechanisms for reporting information, among others (DHS,
2004b). Preparedness plans describe all training needs and how these needs are
identified, how resources can be obtained through mutual-aid agreements, and the
identify the equipment required for the hazards the jurisdiction is most likely to
confront (FEMA, 2004). Corrective Action and Mitigation plans are plans to
implement procedures based on lessons learned from prior incidents or training and
plans that describe all activities to be taken to reduce or eliminate any possible
threat, respectively. Finally, recovery plans are those that describe all actions needed
to enhance recovery from potential emergency scenarios.
Training and exercises constitute the second set of preparedness programs to be
considered by emergency involved organizations. The NIMS states that all
emergency personnel implicated in response to an incident must be properly trained
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for all-hazards and must participate in realistic exercises to enhance their
performance in real-life situations. Exercises allow responders to experience firsthand situations similar to what they may encounter in a real incident. This allows
them not only to identify strengths and weaknesses in their response abilities, but is
also an opportunity to establish relationships with personnel from other agencies and
jurisdictions with whom they do not work regularly. To assist in the standardization
of training and exercises for emergency personnel, the NIMS Integration Center
should develop a national program for education and training (DHS, 2004b). This
center acts as the focal point of all NIMS training requirements to maintain training
standardization, and provides support for emergency exercises.
An important element included in the NIMS is the requirement for standardization
and certification of personnel. This assures that all emergency response personnel
have the minimum knowledge and skills to perform appropriately during an incident.
Standards will include training, experience, credentialing, currency, and physical and
medical fitness (FEMA, 2004). The NIMS Integration Center is responsible for the
development, management, and publication of these standards.
Under NIMS, equipment utilized for emergency response is also required to be
properly certified. This not only guarantees an appropriate level of performance of all
equipment involved, but also allows for interoperability of the equipment across
jurisdictions if the incident requires so.
Incidents that require the intervention of multiple jurisdictions or authorities may
present difficulties when collaboration between them is needed and there are no
previous arrangements between the parties. The NIMS establishes mutual-aid
agreements as a way to avoid these complications and permits that required support
between jurisdictions be handled in an effective way in the stages when it is more
needed, that is, during the actual response to the incident. Jurisdictions should
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identify those entities from which resources may be requested before hand, and
establish agreements that enhance their collaboration efforts. These entities may
include surrounding jurisdictions, neighboring states, and private organizations from
which support may be required.

2.2.3 Resource Management
The third component of the national framework for emergency management
deals with the appropriate coordination and management of resources employed for
incident response. Resources should move quickly and in the most efficient manner
when requested at the site. This, as observed from previous experiences, has been a
significant issue for effective incident response (FEMA, 2004).
During an incident, resources for response may come from various sources,
depending on the characteristics and specific requirements of the event.
Organizations and entities that normally do not operate together may have to
allocate and share resources in the most efficient way possible. To enhance this
process, the NIMS establishes a set of standards and specific requirements for
resource management to be adopted by emergency organizations across the US.
These standards, managed by the NIMS Integration Center, will assure
interoperability and integration as all entities involved work under the same
guidelines.
The NIMS establishes five basic principles for effective resource management,
upon which all standard procedures and mechanisms are based. Specific processes
to comply with each of these principles are shown in Table 2.1 (DHS, 2004b; FEMA,
2004).
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TABLE 2.1 – NIMS basic principles for effective emergency management
(DHS, 2004b; FEMA, 2004)
1. Advance Planning

Preparedness organizations work together
prior to an incident to develop plans for
managing and using resources.

2. Resource identification and ordering

Resource managers use standardized
processes and methods to identify, order,
mobilize, dispatch, and track resources.

3. Categorizing of resources

Resources are categorized by size, capacity,
capability, skill, and other characteristics.

4. Use of agreements

Develop pre-incident agreements for
providing or requesting resources.

5. Effective management of resources

Use validated practices to perform resource
management tasks systematically and
efficiently

The third basic principle deserves further comment, as it is one of the most
important concepts outlined in the NIMS.
The basic idea behind the categorizing of resources is to standardize how
resources from the various sources are classified in a simple and easily
understandable way, to avoid confusion and assure seamless integration during the
response efforts.
The process of categorizing resources is called “typing”, and it is performed
through a detailed method established by the NIMS called the NIMS Resource Typing
System. Based on this system, resources are to be classified using five simple
elements that describe their characteristics: category, kind, components, metrics,
and type. Category refers to the primary function for which a resource is considered
most useful. Figure 2.2 shows all possible categories and their respective
descriptions. Kind refers to a description of the broad class the resource belongs to,
such as personnel, equipment, supplies, vehicles, and aircraft. Components refer to
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Figure 2.2- Categories used in resource typing system (DHS, 2004b)
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the specific elements that comprise the resource. For example, an engine company
may be classified as having different components like a pump, hose 1, hose 2, hose
3, a water tank, a ladder, and personnel (DHS, 2004b). Metrics refer to the
measurement standard used to categorize the resource. The metric used should be
convenient enough to describe the capability and/or capacity of the resource to
incident management personnel. For example, an appropriate metric for a crane may
be the maximum load it can operate. Types are used to categorize resources
according to their capacity and capability from Type I to Type IV. A Type I resource
has a larger capacity than a Type II, III or IV. This way, incident managers can
quickly and effectively recognize the resources available for operations and request
the best suited for the mission. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a fully typed
resource extracted from the NIMS.
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Figure 2.3- Example of a fully typed resource (DHS, 2004b)
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2.2.4 Communications and Information Management
During an incident, a vast amount of information is expected to flow among the
different parties involved in the response effort, both within the incident response
structure, and among the different agencies that need to coordinate activities and
share information. One of the most important issues that emergency management
agencies have to face when attending an emergency is the adequate and efficient
flow of information. It is fundamental that the right information is distributed to the
right personnel at the right time. With the new terrorist framework of operations,
much effort and attention has been placed on the importance of considering the fact
that some of the information shared may be reserved and should not be made
available to people who do not need it.
Considering the above, the NIMS establishes the need for a set of standards for
communications and information management systems to obtain a common
operational picture among the different organizations with emergency management
responsibilities (DHS, 2004b). Although little information is available at this time,
these standards are to be developed by the NIMS Integration Center sometime in the
future, and will consider standards for incident notification and status notification,
information systems for sharing information among Federal, State, local, and private
organizations, as well as standard specifications of communication systems and
technology required to assure interoperability. A national authentication and
certification system will also be established to prevent the information shared from
falling in the wrong hands. Agencies at all levels will also become part of a National
Database of Incident Reports, through the NIMS Integration Center, that will gather
all incident reports to support incident management efforts.
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2.2.5 Supporting Technologies
The NIMS identifies science and technology as an essential component to
implement and adopt efficiently all of the principles and standards proposed.
Therefore, it recognizes the need for on-going research and development of
technologies and systems for support to emergency management operations under
NIMS. Development of new technologies and standards under the NIMS should follow
five principles as shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 – Key principles for supporting technologies
Principle

Description

1. Interoperability and compatibility

Systems must be able to work together and
should not interfere with one another.

2. Technology support

Enhances incident management and
response.

3. Technology standards

Systems and technologies are based on
requirements developed through appropriate
preparedness organizations, following
National standards if required.

4. Broad-based requirements

Needs for new technologies, procedures,
protocols, and standards are identified at the
field and national level. The NIMS provides a
mechanism for prioritization.

5. Strategic planning and R&D

The NIMS Integration Center and the DHS will
integrate all incident management science
and technology needs of organizations under
the NIMS into the National R&D agenda.

2.3. National Response Plan
Using the principles outlined in the NIMS, HSPD-5 directed the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a National Response Plan (NRP). This plan was to
integrate all existing Federal plans into one all-discipline, all-hazard plan, which
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would enhance the role of all Federal departments and agencies with emergency
management responsibilities (Bush, 2003b), by incorporating the principles
established in the NIMS. The NRP, as indicated by HSPD-5, would also unify all
Federal operational tasks into a national level policy, including Federal support to
State and local incident managers.
The National Response Plan (NRP) was released January 6, 2005 in accordance to
HSPD-5. The NRP constitutes a national initiative by the Department of Homeland
Security to standardize and unify all Federal response actions to any Incident of
National Significance. The NRP defines these incidents as “those high-impact events
that require a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of
Federal, State, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to
save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term community
recovery and mitigation activities”. The declaration of an Incident of National
Significance is performed by the Secretary of Homeland Security on situations
related to the following criteria (DHS, 2004c):

1. A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested
the assistance of the Secretary of HS.
2. The resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal
assistance has been requested by State and local authorities.
3. More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially
involved in responding to an incident.
4. The Secretary of HS has been directed to assume responsibility for managing
a domestic incident by the President.

24

The NRP is based on the NIMS framework. It uses the NIMS principles as a way
to establish common training and communication procedures for all entities involved,
and to establish a clear line of authority among the different parties involved,
regardless of the type of incident (DHS, 2004c). By using NIMS, the NRP assures
that the operational framework of Federal involvement in any Incident of National
Significance is consistent with that used by State and local incident management
organizations, hence improving coordination among the parties. As with any Incident
Command framework, the NRP is scalable and can be partially or fully implemented
depending on the severity and the present conditions.
Although the NRP is effective from the date of issuance, its implementation will
undergo a three-phase process. Phase I (0 to 60 days) is intended for Federal
departments and agencies to become familiar with the plan, and modify training and
staffing necessary for final implementation. Phase II (60 to 120 days) will include
any modifications needed to existing Federal interagency plans and conduct
necessary training. Finally, Phase III (120 days to one year) is intended for the NRP
to be fully implemented and operational by all Federal agencies and departments
affected. After this implementation process, the NRP will override all other existing
interagency plans such as the Initial National Response Plan, the Federal Response
Plan, the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations
Plan, and the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (DHS, 2004c).
The NRP consists of several components that follow a similar structure to that of
the earlier Federal Response Plan. A Base Plan section describes the overall structure
and processes that constitute the NRP. A series of Appendices provide additional
relevant information, such as a list of terms, definitions, and a review of other
national interagency plans.
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The NRP uses the same concept of Emergency Support Functions (ESF)
established in the Federal Response Plan, extending the number of these from 12 to
15. The NRP contains an annex for each of these ESFs. Each Emergency Support
Function delineates specific missions, policies, structures, and responsibilities of each
Federal agency, grouping them into specific duties. Depending on the ESF in
question, one or several Federal agencies are assigned as primary agencies
according to their level of involvement and importance, with a set of support
agencies assigned with support roles. In the case where there are multiple primary
agencies, an ESF coordinator is assigned by the primary agencies, and the ESF will
be managed under the concept of Unified Command. Figures 2.4a and 2.4b show the
15 ESFs established by the NRP and the corresponding level of involvement of each
Federal agency assigned.
The following are the ESFs defined by the NRP (DHS, 2004c):
o

ESF #1

– Transportation

o

ESF #2

– Communications

o

ESF #3

– Public Works and Engineering

o

ESF #4

– Firefighting

o

ESF #5

– Emergency Management

o

ESF #6

– Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services

o

ESF #7

– Resource Support

o

ESF #8

– Public Health and Medical Services

o

ESF #9

– Urban Search and Rescue

o

ESF #10

– Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

o

ESF #11

– Agriculture and Natural Resources

o

ESF #12

– Energy

o

ESF #13

– Public Safety and Security

26

FIGURE 2.4a – ESFs and agencies assigned (DHS, 2004c)
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FIGURE 2.4b – ESFs and agencies assigned (DHS, 2004c)
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o

ESF #14

– Long-Term and Community Recovery and Mitigation

o

ESF #15

– External Affairs

For the purpose of this project, it is important to mention the responsibilities
assigned to ESF#1 (Transportation) and ESF#3 (Public Works and Engineering) as
they pertain to some of the tasks INDOT is expected to perform within the
emergency management framework of Indiana.
The Transportation ESF has the US Department of Transportation as ESF
coordinator and primary agency. Some of its primary objectives include reporting
damage to transportation infrastructure resulting from an Incident of National
Significance, coordinating alternate transportation services, coordinating recovery of
the transportation infrastructure affected, and coordinating and supporting
prevention/preparedness/mitigation among transportation infrastructure
stakeholders at the State and local levels (DHS, 2004c).
On the other hand, ESF#3 – Public Works and Engineering has the Department of
Defense/U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as ESF coordinator, in addition to the
Department of Homeland Security/Emergency Preparedness and Response/Federal
Emergency Management Agency as primary agencies. Its main objectives include
providing public works and engineering-related support, including pre- and postincident assessments of public works and infrastructure, and providing technical
assistance for emergency repair of damaged infrastructure and critical facilities
affected by an Incident of National Significance (DHS, 2004c), among others.
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As mentioned above, it is important for INDOT to understand and be well
informed of the responsibilities and tasks Federal agencies may have in the event of
an Incident of National Significance, and how they may complement any initiative
taken at the local level. The scope of activities included in these two ESFs overlap
with some of the responsibilities outlined by Indiana’s emergency management
framework. The NRP works under the assumption that incidents are typically
managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level
(DHS, 2004c). As the incident’s magnitude increases and local capabilities are
overwhelmed, higher levels are requested to provide assistance. The degree of
Federal involvement in local incident operations depends on the Federal authority
over the affected area, the requests for assistance by State or local emergency
management agencies, and the type, location, magnitude, and severity of the event.
Finally, the NRP contains a series of Incident Annexes with specific provisions and
information required for particular types of incidents such as biological, catastrophic,
cyber, food and agriculture, nuclear/radiological, oil and hazardous materials, and
terrorism events.

2.3.1 NRP National Structure
The NRP establishes a national structure for incident management that integrates
the role of the various Federal departments and agencies into the overall
organization used at the State and local levels for large scale events. In this way, a
clear progression of coordination and communication is established from the local
level all the way up to the national level. It is designed in order for the Federal
Government to be able to carry out its various roles during a large scale event.
These include not only the allocation of Federal resources required for adequate
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incident management, but also the direct implementation of eventual Federal-level
strategies.
It is important for INDOT to have a general understanding of the duties assigned
to each one of the components of the national structure stated in the NRP,
considering that in an Incident of National Significance, it will become part of such
national structure, specifically at the local and State level.
The NRP’s national structure for incident management is shown Figure 2.5.
According to its authority and localization, organizational elements are established at
the field, regional, or national level. Within the overall national structure, two basic
types of elements are defined: Command Structures and Coordination Structures.
Command Structures refer to the on-site Incident Command structures established
at the local level by the appropriate emergency response and management agencies.
Coordination Structures on the other hand refer to those structures that are
established for the purpose of organizing activities and the proper allocation of
resources for adequate incident management. Two types of Coordination Structures
are also classified in the NRP according to their objectives: EOCs/Multiagency
Coordination Centers and Multiagency Coordination Entities.
EOCs/Multiagency Coordination Centers are those facilities established to provide
central locations for information sharing and coordination of resource allocation to
support on-scene operations (DHS, 2004c). From Figure 2.5 it can be seen that
these include Local EOCs, State EOCs, the Joint Field Office (JFO), the Regional
Response Coordination Center (RRCC), and the Homeland Security Operations Center
(HSOC).
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FIGURE 2.5 – National Response Plan National Structure (DHS, 2004c)
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Multiagency Coordination Entities on the other hand refer to those units whose
main duty is to coordinate the overall incident management effort by establishing
priorities among the incidents and the allocation of resources, resolving possible
agency policy conflicts, and providing general guidance to support the activities
(DHS, 2004c). The JFO Coordination Group and the Interagency Incident
Management Group (IIMG) are the two bodies comprised in the NRP as Multiagency
Coordination Entities.
According to the NRP (2004c), the President leads the Nation in its effort to
respond effectively to Incidents of National Significance, and is responsible for
ensuring that all the necessary resources are available for this purpose.
Nevertheless, the overall coordination of all activities undertaken by the Federal
departments and agencies involved in an incident that requires Federal intervention
is executed by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
To facilitate information sharing and operational coordination at the national
level, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) is established as part of the
national structure through its National Response Coordination Center (NRCC). The
HSOC was originally established in July 2004 with the purpose of creating a focal
point for collecting and disseminating homeland security information among
agencies, as well as to act as a national coordinating point of incident management
operations (DHS, 2004a). It is a standing facility that concentrates and delivers realtime information on homeland security and situational awareness nationally. For
incident management coordination, as the incident requires, the NRCC activates the
necessary ESFs and notifies the appropriate agencies to report in time to the NRCC.
According to the NRP, some of the roles and responsibilities assigned to the HSOC
(NRCC) for incident management include:
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•

Establishing and maintaining real-time communications links to other Federal
EOCs at the national level, as well as appropriate State, tribal, local, regional,
and NGO EOCs.

•

Maintaining communications with private sector critical infrastructure and key
resources information-sharing entities.

•

Providing general domestic situational awareness, common operational
picture, and support to and acting upon requests for information from the
Interagency Incident Management Group and DHS leadership.

The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) acts as the strategic
coordinating and planning entity for interagency incident management at the Federal
headquarters’ level. According to the characteristics and specific requirements of the
event, it is activated and staffed by senior representatives of the DHS, Federal
department and agencies, and Nongovernmental Organizations. Its composition is
flexible according to the expertise required by the severity and complexity of the
incident. The IIMG also serves as a source of information to the White House and
provides recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Coordination of activities at the regional level is performed by the Regional
Response Coordination Center (RRCC) until the JFO is considered necessary and is
established in the field. The RRCC facility is operated by the DHS/Emergency
Preparedness and Response/FEMA and is activated to coordinate all regional
response efforts, establish Federal priorities, and implement local Federal program
support (DHS, 2004c). Once a JFO is established, all regional activities by the RRCC
are relegated to support responsibilities for the JFO.
The JFO is the multiagency Federal coordination center at the field level. It is
organized using an ICS-type structure as established in the NIMS, including the usual
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command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration sections.
Hence, the JFO structure is flexible enough to accommodate the particular
requirements of specific incidents. Even though the organization of the JFO includes
an operations section, it does not have on-scene operational duties. Its functions
focus primarily on providing proper support to on-scene operations. Following the
specific duties assigned in the ESFs of the NRP, it is staffed by personnel from
Federal departments and agencies, other entities with jurisdictional authority, and
the private sector, as appropriate.
A JFO Coordination Group is established at the field level to direct all activities
performed by the JFO, and provide strategic guidance and resolution of any conflicts
in priorities for allocation of critical Federal resources (DHS, 2004c). This is especially
useful in incidents that require the intervention of multiple States or jurisdictions
(e.g., multiple incidents at separate sites) that may require separate activated JFOs,
each one competing for Federal resources.
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CHAPTER 3 - EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT IN INDIANA

Before going into detail about how emergencies are managed in the State of
Indiana, it is important to recognize that Indiana is susceptible to various types of
disasters, whether these are natural or manmade. Inclement weather patterns affect
the state from time to time, causing floods and snowstorms. Southern parts of the
state are considered to have a high-potential for earthquake activity (INDOT, 2000;
SEMA, 2005). The recent emphasis on terrorist threats is another of the various
types of incidents that must be considered by Indiana’s emergency management
organizations to protect life and property within the state. Many incidents that occur
on a daily basis are effectively managed by local emergency services. Disasters,
however, may impose significant damage on the social and economic system beyond
the capability of local authorities and may require involvement by the state and even
the Federal government, as explained in Chapter 2.
Emergency management in Indiana works under the assumption that, once an
incident occurs, response efforts are assigned first to local-level emergency
management organizations. Involvement by statewide agencies and departments is
required once these local efforts are overwhelmed by the nature or the scale of the
incident, and local agencies are no longer capable of handling the emergency
appropriately. Depending on the severity and complexity of the incident and the
degree of involvement of the different authorities in the response efforts, six levels of
response have been defined for Indiana (SEMA, 2003):
•

Level I

– Local level, no mutual aid or state assistance required.

•

Level II

– Local level, mutual aid requested, no state assistance
required.
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•

Level III

– State assistance requested, State Emergency Operations
Center not activated.

•

Level IV

- State assistance requested, State Emergency Operations
Center activated.

•

Level V

– Governor’s Declaration of Disaster, no federal assistance
requested.

•

Level VI

– Federal assistance requested.

When assistance at the state level is required, state departments and agencies
are required to perform certain tasks and responsibilities to adequately support the
response efforts for the incident at hand. In this manner, agencies are required, not
only to be capable of understanding and assuming certain emergency management
roles additional to their normal operation procedures, but also to be capable of
integrating their efforts consistently. This represents one of the most problematic
issues, considering that agencies that normally do not work together need to
suddenly do so during a very limited time frame.
To focus all emergency efforts and enhance the interoperability of the different
agencies that might be involved during an incident of statewide proportions, all
states in the US are required to have a state emergency management plan
(AASHTO, 2002a). These state plans serve as a central guideline and basic
framework of operations for all state agencies to adopt and implement once an
incident of statewide implications has occurred. Prior to the release of the National
Incident Management System, most state plans, including that of Indiana, followed
the structure of the Federal Response Plan (AASHTO, 2002a). This structure
consisted of a Basic Plan, a set of Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and a series
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of hazard-specific annexes. With the release and implementation of the NIMS, state
emergency plans are expected to be updated as required to contain new measures
required in this new framework.
After the events of 9/11, a new level of concern was raised regarding the degree
of preparedness and the capability of the Nation’s state and local entities to deal with
large scale terrorist incidents. With this in mind, Indiana has adopted a number of
initiatives to update and strengthen its capacity to withstand and respond effectively
to these types of incidents. The purpose of this chapter is to describe how
emergencies are currently managed in the State of Indiana, and the roles agencies
such as the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), local Emergency
Management Agencies, and the Counter-Terrorism and Security Council (C-TASC)
play in this process∗. Finally, INDOT’s current emergency response capabilities are
outlined according to what the research team observed during the development of
this study.

3.1 State Emergency Management Agency – SEMA
After the Civil Defense Act of 1950 was amended in 1979 to create the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state governments were directed to
implement emergency management agencies at the state level (Hamilton County,
2005). Consequently, Indiana Code Title 10 (State of Indiana, 1998) created the
Indiana State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA), which is the lead emergency
management agency in the State. It consists of four divisions, namely,
Mitigation/Recovery, Operations, Preparedness, and Technological Hazards. For the

∗
At the time this document was written, the Governor of Indiana had announced the creation of the
Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS). The IDHS will combine all the state’s emergency
management and homeland security efforts including the roles of SEMA and C-TASC (IDHS, 2005). No
specific modifications in Indiana’s emergency management system or procedures was available at this
time. Therefore, there is no distinction made between SEMA and IDHS in this document.
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purpose of this study, it is important to focus to some extent on how the Operations
division works, and how emergency response efforts are handled within the state.
As mentioned above, SEMA is the lead emergency management agency in
Indiana. However, as a way to enhance preparedness and response coordination
locally, all counties in the state have Emergency Management Agencies (EMAs) as
part of their local governments (State of Indiana, 1998). Each EMA has an
Emergency Management Plan that includes procedures to follow during the
occurrence of an emergency, including a detailed chain of command and an outline
of all tasks assigned to local agencies that may be called upon to support response
efforts. An Emergency Management Advisory Council (EMAC) consisting of local
authorities and agencies involved in emergency management is also part of each
EMA. The EMAC serves as a supervising and controlling body for all emergency
management programs in the county (State of Indiana, 1998). All emergency
management programs and efforts of each EMA are supported and coordinated with
SEMA. However, EMAs are not part of SEMA, but part of the local governments. As of
2003, Indiana had an EMA assigned to each of the 92 counties. Of these, 36 had fulltime staffs, 49 part-time, and 7 relied on volunteers (C-TASC, 2003).
When the scale or nature of an incident requires local governments to seek State
assistance, county officials may declare a local state of emergency. Assistance to
local governments is then coordinated through SEMA, and if required, the State
Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is activated for this purpose.
The EOC serves as a multiagency coordination center as explained in Chapter 2.
It functions as the central point for all information from state agencies, volunteer
organizations (such as the Red Cross), and EMAs involved in the response efforts to
coordinate their activities. As explained later in Section 3.2, the EOC is the
coordination point of all activities and responsibilities outlined in the Indiana
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Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). Figure 3.1 shows the chain of
coordination of these activities and how these are all concentrated through the EOC.
Representatives from the organizations and agencies involved in the emergency
response effort may be required to assemble in the EOC as a way to improve
coordination between the different parties.

FIGURE 3.1 – EOC Chain of Coordination
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An important component of SEMA’s operational efforts is the Mobile Command
Center (MCC) shown in Figure 3.2. The MCC provides on-site support and assistance
to the EOC. It is fully equipped with laptop computers, radio systems, satellite
phones, cellular phones, hard-line telephones, FAX, and televisions for monitoring
local broadcasts. These features enable the MCC to handle information to and from
the EOC, and provide support to local residents during an emergency. Its
communication systems are also interoperable with the Indiana State Police, the
Department of Natural Resources, the National Guard, and Federal agencies, if
required (SEMA, 2004).

FIGURE 3.2 - SEMA’s Mobile Command Center (SEMA, 2004)

At the time this report was written, a new MCC was planned to be acquired by
SEMA. According to SEMA, this new MCC will have more capacity than the current
MCC, and will additionally be able to accommodate authorities and personnel from
the local agencies involved in the response efforts, if required, as a way to further
coordinate incident activities.
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3.2 Indiana Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan – CEMP
For the specific case of the State of Indiana, the Indiana Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan (SEMA, 2003), developed and maintained by SEMA,
constitutes the State’s emergency plan. The CEMP addresses emergency procedures
and actions to be implemented by Indiana agencies in the event of a disaster, once
all efforts by local emergency management agencies are overwhelmed by the nature
of the incident, and assistance from the State government is required. The plan is
activated as the situation warrants by the Executive Director of SEMA, or
immediately when a state of emergency is declared by the Governor (SEMA, 2003).
The CEMP follows an all-hazards approach to emergency management. As a
result, the elements of the plan are applicable for any type of emergency, whether it
is a natural disaster or a man-made incident. The structure of the CEMP is shown in
Figure 3.3. As mentioned above, the CEMP was developed following a structure
similar to that of the former Federal Response Plan, that is now in NIMS. The CEMP is
divided into six sections, as shown in Figure 3.3, with a set of ESFs assigned to each
one of these sections. For example, the Infrastructure Support Section is subdivided
into four ESFs: Public Works/Engineering, Energy, Damage Assessment, and
Transportation. Similar to the concept used in the NIMS, the CEMP gives a primary
agency direct responsibilities for each of these ESFs, and a set of support agencies
take care of support activities. Figures 3.4a and 3.4b show the primary and support
agencies for each one of the ESFs in the CEMP.
Once the CEMP is activated, all activities outlined in the CEMP are coordinated
through the EOC. Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure applied to coordinate activities
in the EOC once the CEMP is activated.
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FIGURE 3.3 - Indiana Comprehensive Emergency Management Organization
(SEMA, 2003)
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Each ESF is further divided into the four basic components of emergency
management, namely, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. For each of
these components, tasks are assigned in checklist form for agencies to perform as
required. To illustrate this, Figure 3.6 shows the response tasks defined in the
Transportation ESF of the CEMP. The CEMP outlines all tasks so that each State
agency or department is aware of its responsibilities in an emergency and the actions
it may be asked to perform. The means to accomplish each one of these tasks,
however, is the responsibility of each agency. For a detailed description of all the
tasks assigned to INDOT for each ESF of the CEMP, refer to Appendix A.
The Hazard Specific Section of the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
addresses issues not covered in the other sections of the plan for specific types of
hazards, specifically for those involving terrorism. It is an attachment with duties
each agency has to perform in the event of a terrorist attack, in addition to those
already covered in the rest of the plan.
As mentioned above, all State agencies are expected to be capable of performing
the tasks outlined in the CEMP when an emergency requires. In this manner, the
CEMP directs all State departments and agencies to develop a Standard Operating
Procedures (SOP) plan as a way to guarantee adequate preparedness once an
incident of significance occurs. The Standard Operating Procedures plan must include
some basic elements, such as (SEMA, 2003):
•

Designation of lines of succession and delegating authority for the successors

•

Provisions for the preservation of records

•

Procedures for the relocation of essential departments to ensure continuity of
government

•

Procedures to deploy essential personnel, equipment and supplies
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FIGURE 3.4a – Primary and Support Agencies by ESF (SEMA, 2003)
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FIGURE 3.4b – Primary and Support Agencies by ESF (SEMA, 2003)
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FIGURE 3.5 –EOC Chain of Coordination (SEMA, 2003)
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FIGURE 3.6 - Response tasks assigned by the CEMP in the Transportation
Emergency Support Function
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State agencies are also required, as stipulated under Executive Order 02-16 of
2002, to designate a State Agency Emergency Management Coordinator and at least
two back-ups to act as the coordination point of the agency in all emergency and
disaster matters (O’Bannon, 2002). Documentation of activities to SEMA’s Executive
Director is also required for agencies included in the CEMP, both during and after a
State of Emergency is declared by the Governor. A daily Situation Report is to be
submitted during the State of Emergency, and an after-action report including all the
costs incurred must be submitted once the event has concluded.

3.3 Indiana Counter-Terrorism and Security Council - C-TASC
As it has been mentioned before, the new terrorist threat transformed the way
agencies had been considering emergency management. Shortly after 9/11, many
States created homeland security offices and organizations to concentrate specifically
on the possibility of terrorist attacks within each jurisdiction. The DHS further
directed all State governors to name a State homeland security contact who would
be the point of contact between the DHS and the State government in matters of
homeland security.
In a similar way, Indiana created the Counter-Terrorism and Security Council
(C-TASC) that serves as a liaison between the State and the DHS. The main purpose
of C-TASC was to serve as a central guide of all counter-terrorist activities required
to protect the State from a terrorist attack, by developing a State strategy for
homeland security (C-TASC, 2003). The Council, which meets periodically to revise
and update this strategy, consists of a number of different authorities within the
State, such as the Lieutenant Governor, a State Senator and a State Representative,
and members of the Indiana Department of Environmental Management, the
Commissioner of Agriculture, Indiana State Police, Indiana National Guard, the State
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Fire Marshall, the Indiana State Department of Health, the State Emergency
Management Agency, and the Indiana Department of Transportation.
In January 2003, C-TASC released Indiana’s Strategy for Homeland Security (CTASC, 2003). The document is a guide with specific goals that Indiana must
concentrate on to enhance its capability to withstand a potential terrorist incident. It
is based on information obtained from diverse sources both within Indiana, such as
local expert opinions and advisory groups, as well as from national trends and best
practices (C-TASC, 2003). The Strategy recognizes four critical mission areas and
proposes initiatives to enhance each one of these. These mission areas are:
•

Intelligence warning and counter-terrorism

•

Protection of critical infrastructure, key assets and events

•

Defense against catastrophic events

•

Emergency preparedness and response.

The emergency preparedness and response mission area deserves further
comment because it is related to the purpose of this project and is intended to affect
emergency response in Indiana. According to C-TASC (2003), all emergency
response activities should follow an all-hazards approach. Because the Incident
Command System (ICS) works under this principle (refer to Section 4.1), the
Strategy identifies this system as the protocol to be implemented by all emergency
response agencies, and proposes a thorough training regimen to standardize its
practice. Another proposed initiative outlined in the Strategy is the need to revise the
adequacy of the State EOC, and to consider the possibility to relocate it to a more
suitable location. The strategy also highlights the need to normalize EMA operational
procedures and preparedness efforts by implementing mechanisms such as the
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development of minimum performance standards, comprehensive emergency
management plans, and standard operating procedures.

3.4 Indiana Department of Transportation - INDOT
As stated in the CEMP, the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) plays
a vital role in emergency management in Indiana. When assistance is required,
INDOT will be expected to perform certain tasks that may be different from its
normal day-to-day operations. As stated in AASHTO’s A Guide to Updating Highway
Emergency Response Plans for Terrorist Incidents (AASHTO, 2002a), INDOT as a
State DOT has two sets of responsibilities to focus on during emergency response.
There are internal responsibilities, which refer to all arrangements within INDOT that
need to be performed to accomplish the tasks outlined in the CEMP, and external
responsibilities, which refer to the specific tasks outlined in the CEMP for the more
general Indiana emergency management framework. As mentioned before, the CEMP
outlines all tasks to be accomplished by INDOT; these constitute its external
responsibilities. However, the means to accomplish each one of these tasks lie within
INDOT’s capacity and operational capability. Therefore, INDOT’s inherent
organization should be prepared to perform these external tasks; these constitute its
internal responsibilities.
For the development of this study, the research team invested considerable time
in understanding INDOT’s current emergency response procedures and capabilities.
During this time, we were able to attend a number of security-related meetings and
discussions within the agency, including those of the INDOT C-TASC.
The INDOT C-TASC is a committee formed within INDOT as a result of the
concern about the agency’s preparedness and capacity to respond adequately to the
new terrorist threat and its implications. It consists of high-level INDOT officials and
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representatives from its different divisions and districts. It meets regularly to discuss
transportation security issues and programs that need to be considered within the
agency. Input from representatives of external agencies such as the Indiana State
Police (ISP) and SEMA, and the various Purdue security-related projects is also
considered.
As a way to focus on the numerous matters of transportation security, INDOT CTASC has designated five subcommittees to concentrate on individual topics of
interest. These subcommittees are the Awareness/Education Subcommittee, the
Prevention Subcommittee, the Communications Subcommittee, the Incident
Response Subcommittee, and the Assessment Subcommittee. Each of these
subcommittees has developed a list of action items within its purview to address
what they identify as their most important issues. Some action items have been
addressed; others need further attention.
Current INDOT capabilities were also observed by attending a mock drill designed
by Professor Shimon Nof and his team at Purdue University. The mock drill consisted
of a computer-based scenario that simulated a series of terrorist events in Indiana’s
highway system and allowed the different participants of the drill, including
representatives from two INDOT districts, INDOT central office, SEMA, and the ISP,
to make decisions as the situation evolved. The decisions made by each one of the
parts affected the overall situation of the incident and its possible outcome, just as it
would in a real emergency. This exercise proved to be an excellent opportunity to
observe INDOT’s current capabilities and procedures to handle a serious attack on
the transportation infrastructure. It also allowed INDOT to see more clearly what its
actual strengths and weaknesses are in the case of a significant emergency.
Based on our observations, several comments and conclusions can be stated
about INDOT’s current emergency management capabilities. The following is a
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description of issues observed by the research team during the development of this
project.

3.4.1 Emergency Operations Plan - EOP
INDOT’s external responsibilities in response to an emergency are basically
supportive. INDOT’s emergency operations are performed today based on having
developed relationships with key individuals in other agencies (e.g., ISP, DNR,
SEMA). Based on prior experience, INDOT personnel in both the districts and the
central office know what to do and whom to contact (both internally and externally),
depending on the type of event. Even though this practice may has proved to be
effective for INDOT in dealing with common incidents (USDOT, 2003), the new
terrorist framework in emergency management and the potential threat of incidents
involving WMD pose a significant challenge and may require revising current
procedures and developing new practices. For these types of events, agencies with
no previous relationship may have to work closely with INDOT, and this new
relationship might have to be formed in the wake of a catastrophe. Clearly, this is
neither convenient nor desirable. Furthermore, normal contacts within INDOT, as
well as those outside the agency, may not be available during an incident, and this
has to be accounted for beforehand.
As this report is being written, there is no INDOT Emergency Operations Plan.
There is no set of standards and operating procedures designed to be implemented
for response to an incident. In such a way, INDOT relies exclusively on the previous
knowledge and prior experience that its employees possess regarding the procedures
to follow during an emergency. Although outlines of emergency plans have been
drawn up by some INDOT Districts, especially to comply with OSHA emergency
standards (e.g., building evacuation procedures and fire escape routes), there are no
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specific standards as to the precise requirements and development of highway
emergency plans and procedures. Furthermore, these plans are not well known to or
coordinated with the Central Office.

3.4.2 Lines of Authority and Communication
When an incident occurs, it is important for INDOT personnel to understand and
be clear about what their specific duties are and what they are expected to do.
Furthermore, it is important for all personnel involved to understand who is in control
and what lines of authority to follow, because these may be different from the usual
operational structure. From what we observed during this project, INDOT does not
have a specific command structure to adopt during response to an emergency. This
was apparent during the INDOT mock drill. The decision-making process varied from
district to district and coordination between districts had to be improvised. There was
also uncertainty on the part of the districts as to what was the role and authority of
INDOT’s Central Office during an incident.
During emergency operations, a continuous and significant flow of information
may be expected to occur from a number of different sources. Information, which
may sometimes be even contradictory, may be originating from the incident site, the
EOC, an INDOT district, or INDOT’s Central Office. With this in mind, it is crucial that
all information is delivered to the correct personnel when it is required, and in the
safest and most secure manner. In a similar way, as with the lines of authority, there
are no pre-specified lines of communication defined for INDOT to adopt during
emergencies. During the INDOT mock drill, there was uncertainty as to whom to call,
under what circumstances and how to do so, when the situation was not one that
had been faced before. Furthermore, participants were uncertain as to what kind of
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information would be available to them if an incident like the one simulated actually
occurred.

3.4.3 Standard Operating Procedures
Based on our observations during this project, there currently exists no set of
Standard Operating Procedures to be adopted by the INDOT Districts and INDOT
Central Office for emergency response operational tasks. The decisions as to what to
do and how to do it are basically made independently within each INDOT District
based on individual judgment. An example is road closure decisions during the
INDOT mock drill. The incidents being simulated caused some significant roadways to
be closed and alternate routes to be identified. The decisions to close the roads, and
what specific roads to close, were made by each district independently, based on
their own judgment about the situation. No standard procedures existed as to guide
how these decisions were to be made, and what implications had to be considered in
deciding which roads to close. If consideration was given to the capacity of the
alternate routes motorists would have to use, or the potential need to modify traffic
signals on these routes, it was not obvious to observers of the mock drill. Basically,
the decisions of which roads to close were made by observing the location of the
affected roadways and estimating what the best alternate routes were by their
location on a map. The decisions may have been proper en expedient, but there was
uncertainty as to what agencies had to be contacted regarding a road closure
decision, or if there was a need to at all.
The closest approximation to a set of Standard Operating Procedures found for
INDOT is that for the structural assessment of bridges and roads after an earthquake
as stated in INDOT Post-Earthquake Safety Evaluation of Bridges and Roads CD-ROM
(INDOT, 2000). This CD-ROM contains a set of procedures for the structural
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evaluation of bridges and roads by INDOT personnel following an earthquake. It
defines two basic levels of inspection that can be performed according to the level of
expertise of the personnel performing the assessment. Inspection Level 1 is intended
to be a rapid assessment by INDOT personnel with a broad range of backgrounds,
while Level 2 consists of a more thorough inspection to be performed by INDOT
engineers. Outlined in the CD-ROM are specific procedures to follow for each of the
inspection levels, including detailed steps for the evaluation, use of report forms,
equipment required for the assessment, and procedures for closing damaged bridges
to traffic.

3.4.4 Knowledge of Statewide Emergency Management
As has been mentioned before, INDOT is just a part of a statewide emergency
response effort that includes the involvement of a number of different organizations
working towards the same goal. With this in mind, it is important for INDOT to
understand what its role is and where it stands in this larger state emergency
management framework. Furthermore, it is vital to understand what this framework
is and how it works.
An important issue observed during the INDOT mock drill was the unfamiliarity of
INDOT personnel with SEMA and ISP roles and procedures. Participants of the mock
drill were uncertain of the roles other agencies played in the response operations,
how these other agencies could be contacted, or if contacting them was appropriate
at all. Some participants knew of the existence of a State EOC and SEMA’s role as an
emergency coordinator of activities. However, there was uncertainty as to what the
role of INDOT was and how it related to SEMA. Some participants didn’t know if a
contact with SEMA had to be established directly, and what were the means to do so.
Some were aware of the existence of an INDOT representative in the State EOC.
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Nevertheless, they were not certain as to who this contact was, his/her specific role,
and how he/she could be contacted. Basically, there was little knowledge as to what
the role of SEMA was, and how it related to INDOT.
It is imperative for INDOT personnel to have proper knowledge of emergency
management in Indiana, where INDOT stands, and what are the roles of the different
agencies involved. This also includes knowledge of the basic terminology used in an
emergency and what it means (e.g., State of Emergency, Command Post, and EOC).
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CHAPTER 4 – BEST PRACTICES IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The terrorist events of 9/11 highlighted the need for transportation agencies to
reconsider their level of preparedness to respond adequately to large scale incidents.
Up to that point, highway emergency response was considered as a local issue and
concentrated mainly on natural disasters (AASHTO, 2002a). Departments of
Transportation had different stages of preparedness, depending on the levels and
types of risks considered, on a region by region basis.
In an effort to update and enhance emergency response capabilities in the new
terrorist threat framework of operations, DOTs across the nation have adopted and
implemented a number of different initiatives tailored to their specific needs and
budgets. As a result, the level of preparedness of DOTs varies from State to State. In
addition, a wealth of information from diverse sources has been developed and is
now available for DOTs to consider. Agencies and organizations like FHWA, FTA,
AASHTO, TRB, and ITE, as well as private organizations and academia are constantly
developing new material regarding transportation security. Emergency response
articles and papers are continuously being published on the Internet. Furthermore,
the Federal government’s concern in security is constantly affecting transportation
agencies’ security policies.
In this way, identifying what specific measures and requirements to address in
order to enhance DOT response capabilities is not an easy task. The purpose of this
chapter is to present what the research team has identified as the best practices in
highway emergency response currently available and applicable to INDOT. The
chapter is the result of an extensive literature search and review of material
available from a number of sources, some of which were not exclusively
transportation oriented.
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In addition to the literature review, the research team concentrated on current
practices employed by other State DOTs. Several State DOTs and State Homeland
Security Departments were contacted by phone and/or e-mail, and two surveys were
performed to obtain information on current practices across the US. Both of these
surveys were distributed to the 50 State DOTs.
The first survey was sent to transportation security contacts at each state DOT.
Contact was made initially with the Highway Performance Monitoring System (HPMS)
specialist at each state DOT, who forwarded the survey to the appropriate state DOT
transportation security expert. This survey concentrated specifically on the use of the
Incident Command System (ICS) by DOTs, and will be referred to as the “ICS
Survey” in this document. A total of 13 responses were obtained. The second survey
was performed through AASHTO’s Transportation Security Forum in collaboration
with INDOT. This survey addressed a number of questions regarding transportation
security, including the use of ICS, the existence of Emergency Operations Plans, and
the use of Decision Support Systems (DSS) by State DOTs. A copy of the
questionnaire used for this survey is attached as Appendix B.

4.1 Incident Command System – ICS
Emergency response efforts may often involve the participation of a number of
different response agencies and organizations that need to work together and share
resources in the most effective and efficient way possible. Local level incidents may
involve interaction between local law enforcement agencies and fire departments, as
well as other local emergency response organizations. When the nature and scale of
the incident requires it, State and Federal level agencies may also be required to
support local emergency response efforts, as explained in Chapter 2.
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Because some of these emergency response organizations do not work together
in their routine non-emergency operations, coordination and effective cooperation
between them can be a significant challenge in emergency management.
Furthermore, the role of each of the parties involved may differ according to the type
of incident, whether it is a fire, a chemical spill, or a terrorist incident, to name a
few. Different types of incidents may require different response activities and
different emergency agencies involved. Regardless of the size of the incident or the
number of agencies involved in the response, all incidents require a coordinated
effort to ensure an effective response and the efficient, safe use of resources (FEMA,
1998).
As a way to standardize how emergency response activities are integrated and
coordinated at the incident site, the Incident Command System (ICS) has emerged
as one of the Nation’s best practices in emergency response. Its basic objective is to
standardize how emergency response efforts are coordinated by applying (a) a basic
operational structure that adapts to the complexity and demands of the incident, and
(b) a set of standard principles for all responding agencies. In this manner, all
agencies will be “speaking the same language” during response to an emergency.
The Incident Command System was first conceived in southern California in the
1970s after response efforts to a series of wildfires highlighted recurrent problems in
response operations such as (DHS, 2004b; FEMA, 1998; OSHA, 2004):
•

Unclear lines of authority

•

Too many people reporting to one supervisor

•

Different emergency response organizational structures among responding
agencies.

•

Lack of coordinated planning efforts among responding agencies.

•

Nonstandard terminology among responding agencies.
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•

Lack of capability to expand and contract as required by the situation.

•

Inadequate, nonstandard and nonintegrated communications.

•

Lack of consolidated action plans.

•

Unclear or unspecified incident objectives.

•

Lack of designated facilities.

These set of recurrent problems were found to be common in many other types
of emergencies other than wildfires, especially for those that involved the
collaboration of different agencies at the incident. Hence, after its creation, the ICS
has been adopted by a vast number of emergency agencies as their standard
structure for incident response. Although the original ICS has evolved through time,
its essential principles and basic organizational structure are still applied today. Its
effectiveness has been tested and proven in all types of emergency scenarios in the
US, and it is now considered as the standard emergency response system structure.
As mentioned in Chapter 3, initial compliance to NIMS requires all emergency
response agencies to adopt ICS by FY2005. This includes ICS training of agency
personnel who may be asked to be part of an ICS.
The effectiveness of the system is based upon applying a series of basic concepts
and principles that allow the model to address some of the most common issues
encountered in emergency response operations. These basic concepts and principles,
summarized in Table 4.1, include the use of common terminology, a modular
organization, integrated communications, application of the concept of unity of
command, a unified command structure to organize operations, the use of
consolidated Incident Action Plans (IAPs), a manageable span of control, the use of
designated incident facilities, and the comprehensive management of resources
(FEMA, 1998).

61

The following sections expand on the organization of the ICS structure, its
different components, and how these basic principles are considered and applied in
the model.

Table 4.1 ICS basic concepts (FEMA, 1998).
Principle

Description

1. Common terminology

- Common names for all resources, as well as
for all facilities in and around the incident
area.
- Radio transmissions in plain English, without
codes.

2. Modular organization

- Organizational structure at the incident
develops from the top down.

3. Integrated communications

- Common communications plan, standard
operating procedures, clear text, common
frequencies, and common terminology.

4. Unity of command

- Each person within the organization reports
to only one designated person.

5. Unified command structure

- Responding agencies manage incident by
establishing a common set of incident
objectives and strategies.

6. Consolidated Incident Action Plans - IAPs

-Written or oral plan describing all goals,
operational objectives, and support activities
for a period of time.

7. Manageable span of control

- Number of individuals one supervisor can
handle is limited (usually five).

8. Designated incident facilities

- Incident Command Post and Staging Areas.

9. Comprehensive resource management

4.1.1 ICS Basic Structure
The basic ICS structure consists of five essential elements as shown in Figure
4.1: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration.
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Emergency personnel working in the Command section are normally referred to as
the Command Staff, while all personnel on the other four sections are part of the
General Staff.
Responsibilities in emergency response start with the Incident Commander (IC)
in the Command element of the structure, and build from the top down. As the
complexity of the incident demands, some or all of the other four sections can be
activated by the IC to properly organize emergency management efforts. Once this is
done, a Section Chief is assigned to each activated element to coordinate and
manage activities. For example, if the Planning Section is activated by the IC, a
Planning Section Chief is assigned. The ICS organizational structure is modular,
extending to incorporate all elements necessary for the type, size, scope, and
complexity of a given incident (DHS, 2004b). In this manner, each of the sections
can be further broken down into units or branches to adapt to the specific needs of
the incident.
COMMAND

OPERATION
SECTION

PLANNING
SECTION

LOGISTICS
SECTION

Command
Staff

FINANCE/ADMIN.
SECTION

General
Staff

Figure 4.1 – ICS Basic Structure (DHS, 2004b)

4.1.2 Incident Facilities
ICS identifies three types of incident facilities that can be implemented by the IC
when a given incident so requires (FEMA, 1998): an Incident Command Post (ICP),
one or more Staging Areas, and a Base. The precise need for one or more of these
facilities is given by the characteristics and requirements of each incident.
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The ICP is the location where the IC is positioned and where all primary
command functions take place (FEMA, 1998). For short-term small scale incidents,
the ICP is usually a response vehicle such as a fire truck or patrol car (OSHA, 2004).
For more complex events, however, the IC may denote a specific facility that will
serve as the ICP for the entire response period. In either case, an ICP is always
established.
Staging areas are locations designated for the specific purpose of storing and
managing resources while they are assigned to response activities. As incidents
become larger, a growing number of resources may be allocated to the incident,
compromising the effectiveness of the response if these are not handled
appropriately. Thus, the utilization of Staging Areas can avoid these problems,
because resources are easily identified and promptly located when required.
For emergencies that require response efforts to continue over an extended
period of time in which personnel is expected to come in and out of the incident site,
the IC may establish a Base. The Base is the facility used to provide primary services
and support activities for out-of-service personnel (FEMA, 1998). If established, it is
also the place where the Logistics Section is located.

4.1.3 Command Function
The Command Function is conducted by the Incident Commander (IC). The IC is
the individual in charge at the incident, responsible for all aspects of the response,
including the development of incident objectives and managing all incident-related
operations. Specific responsibilities assigned to the IC are shown in Table 4.2.
When an incident occurs, the IC position is initially taken by the senior firstresponder to arrive at the scene (FEMA, 1998). Regardless of the type of incident, all
emergencies have an IC. Once the incident evolves and/or additional units from
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other responding agencies arrive at the scene, the IC position may be transferred to
other officers with higher authority over the incident. The ICS details specific
procedures for transferring command, such as briefing requirements to the new IC
and notification procedures.

Table 4.2 – Command Staff Basic Responsibilities (OSHA, 2004)
Position

Responsibilities

Incident Commander - IC

•

Establish and monitor incident organization.

•

Brief Command Staff and Section Chiefs

•

Establish immediate priorities especially the safety of responders,
other emergency workers, bystanders, and people involved in the
incident.

•

Information Officer

Determine incident objectives and strategy to achieve the objectives.

•

Authorize release of information to the news media.

•

Approve the implementation of the Incident Action Plan (IAP).

•

Coordinate activities for all staff under the ICS.

•

Coordinate with key people and officials.

•

Approve requests for additional resources or for their release.

•

Order the demobilization of the incident when appropriate.

•

Obtain IC approval of media releases.

•

Inform media and conduct media briefings.

•

Obtain media information that may be useful to incident planning.

•

Maintain current information summaries on the incident and provide
information on the status of the incident to assigned personnel.

Liaison Officer

•

Assist in establishing and coordinating interagency contacts.

•

Monitor incident operations to identify current or potential interorganizational problems.

Safety Officer

•

Participate in planning meetings.

•

Review the Incident Action Plan (IAP) for safety implications.

•

Identify and produce correction of occupational safety and health
hazards.

•

Continuously monitor workers for exposure to safety or health hazards
conditions.

•

Alter, suspend, evacuate or terminate activities that may pose
imminent safety or health danger to the workers.

•

Take appropriate action to mitigate or eliminate unsafe condition,
operation or hazard.
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For example, consider the case where there is an emergency call of suspicious
activity in a residential neighborhood and a police patrol unit is sent to respond to
the scene. As the police officer is the first person to arrive at the scene, he/she will
perform the duties of the IC. When the police officer arrives at the scene and
investigates the area, a shooting between rival gangs begins. The police officer calls
for backup and additional police units arrive at the scene. A higher-ranking officer
with higher authority is part of these additional units, and so, takes control of the
response efforts and assumes the role of IC. The suspects are controlled by the
police officers at the scene and are taken into custody. However, a fire has been
started in one of the nearby buildings due to the shooting. The IC calls for support
from a fire unit to control the situation. Because the incident’s major objective at this
time is to control the fire, when the fire unit arrives, command is transferred to the
senior fire official who arrives at the scene. That fire official acts as IC until the fire is
controlled.
When the nature and magnitude of the incident overwhelms the capacity of the
IC, a series of positions with support roles for the IC can also be activated
accordingly. These positions consist of the Information Officer, the Liaison Officer,
and the Safety Officer. The Information Officer’s role is to develop and release
information about the incident to the news media, to incident personnel, and to other
appropriate agencies and organizations (OSHA, 2004). The Liaison Officer on the
other hand, serves as the point of contact for assisting and coordinating activities
between the IC and other agencies and groups. This position is mainly required for
incidents that are multi-jurisdictional, in which coordination between different
agencies is expected. The Safety Officer’s role is to develop and recommend
measures to the IC for assuring personnel health and safety and to assess and/or
anticipate any hazardous or unsafe situations (OSHA, 2004).
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Although many incidents can be handled properly by an IC, others may require a
different approach. Having a single authority from a specific agency has been proven
to be inconvenient in some events, as in the case where operations involve the
participation of a significant number of responding agencies. In addition, identifying
a single authority in large scale incidents may not be an easy task, especially when
agencies from multiple jurisdictions attend the emergency. In these types of cases, a
Unified Command approach may be adopted, where command is taken by multiple
incident commanders representing the various agencies involved. Decisions
concerning the incident, including the development of objectives, are then made in
conjunction with all the members of the Unified Command, thus, improving
coordination of activities and avoiding duplication of efforts.

4.1.4 Operations Section
The Operations Section is responsible for all operations directly applicable to the
primary mission of the response. Once activated by the IC, an Operations Section
Chief is designated as the person responsible of all activities developed within the
section. A list of its primary responsibilities is outlined in Table 4.3.
The way in which the different operational elements are organized within the ICS
structure depends on the type of incident, the agencies involved, and the specific
objectives and strategies to follow (FEMA, 1998). Agencies that could be included in
the Operations Section include fire, law enforcement, public health, public works, and
emergency services (FEMA, 2004). As the incident evolves, resources from these
various sources will be assigned and deployed to accomplish diverse objectives
within the overall response objectives. Following the definition stated in the NIMS,
resources refer both to all the equipment allocated for incident response as well the
personnel assigned (DHS, 2004b). As the number of resources assigned exceeds the
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maximum span of control of the Operations Section Chief, the Operations Section
can be further broken down into divisions or groups as shown in Figure 4.2.

Table 4.3 – Section Chiefs Basic Responsibilities (OSHA, 2004)
Position

Responsibilities

Operations Section Chief

•

Develop operations portion of the IAP.

•

Brief and assign Operations Section personnel in accordance
with the IAP.

•

Supervise Operations Section.

•

Determine need and request additional resources.

•

Report information about special activities, events, and
occurrences to the IC.

Planning Section Chief

•

Supervise preparation of the IAP.

•

Provide input to the IC and the Operations Section Chief in
preparing the IAP.

•

Establish special information collection activities as necessary

•

Collect and process situation information.

•

Determine the need for any specialized resources in support
of the incident.

Logistics Section Chief

•

Participate in preparation of IAP.

•

Prepare service and support elements of the IAP.

•

Identify service and support requirements for planned and
expected operations.

Finance/Administration Section Chief

•

Plan the organization of the Logistics Section

•

Coordinate and process requests for additional resources.

•

Advise on current service and support capabilities.

•

Manage all financial aspects of the incident.

•

Provide financial and cost analysis information.

•

Maintain contact with agency(s) administrative headquarters
on Finance/Administration matters.
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OPERATIONS
SECTION

Branches

Divisions or Groups

Resources

FIGURE 4.2 – Organizational Elements of Operations (FEMA, 2004)

Divisions always refer to physical or geographical areas of operation, while
groups refer to functional areas. Adopting this type of structure not only maintains a
proper span of control, but also organizes how these resources are allocated to the
incident and clarifies the objectives each one is assigned to perform. The decision
regarding whether to use divisions or groups depends on the type of incident. Some
cases demand that the Operations Section be broken down geographically for better
organization, while in others, resources are better organized by the function they are
assigned to perform. Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 show examples of the general
breakdown when geographical divisions and functional groups are used, respectively.
When the number of divisions and/or groups exceeds the proper span of control of
the Operations Section Chief, these can be grouped accordingly into branches as
shown in Figure 4.5.
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OPERATIONS
SECTION

DIVISION A
(geographic area A)

DIVISION B
(geographic area B)

DIVISION C
(geographic area C)

FIGURE 4.3 – Example of use of Geographical Divisions (DHS, 2004b)

OPERATIONS
SECTION
SUPPRESSION
GROUP

RESCUE
GROUP

EMERGENCY MEDICAL
SERVICE GROUP

FIGURE 4.4 – Example of use of Functional Groups (DHS, 2004b)

OPERATIONS
SECTION

BRANCH I

GROUP A

DIVISION B

BRANCH II

GROUP B

GROUP C

DIVISION D

FIGURE 4.5 – Branches (DHS, 2004b)

4.1.5 Planning Section
In cases where a large scale incident planning effort is required that exceeds the
capacity of the IC, a Planning Section can be activated. Its basic responsibilities
include the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of all tactical information related
to the incident (FEMA, 1998). The Planning Section is also responsible for
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maintaining the status of resources assigned to the incident, and for preparing and
documenting the IAP. As mentioned before, the IAP is an oral or written plan that
contains objectives reflecting the overall incident strategy, specific tactical actions,
and supporting information for each operational period, which is usually of 12 or 24
hours (DHS, 2004b).
As with all other sections of ICS, a Planning Section Chief is assigned to oversee
all activities within the section. The Chief’s basic responsibilities are outlined in Table
4.3. When assigned, the Planning Section Chief is responsible for all tasks designated
to the Planning Section. As incidents evolve, its capacity may be exceeded and thus
a series of units can be activated as shown in Figure 4.6. Each of these units will
perform a series of designated responsibilities as shown in Table 4.4. When a unit is
activated, a Leader is designated to oversee all activities and personnel within the
unit.

PLANNING
SECTION

Resources Unit

Situation Unit

Documentation Unit
Demobilization Unit

Technical Specialists

FIGURE 4.6 – Planning Section Breakdown (DHS, 2004B)
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Because ICS is intended to adapt to all types of incidents, specialists from diverse
fields of expertise may be required to support the overall incident objectives.
Although these specialists can be assigned to different sections of the ICS structure,
a special division is provided within the Planning Section. Examples of technical
specialists include weather observers, environmental specialists, human resources
experts, GIS specialists, and legal specialists (OSHA, 2004).

TABLE 4.4 – Planning Section Unit Tasks (DHS, 2004b; OSHA, 2004)
Planning Section Unit

Responsibilities

Resources Unit

• Keep track of the current location and status of all assigned
resources.
• Maintain a list of all resources committed to incident operations.

Situation Unit

• Collect, process, and organize ongoing situation information.
• Develop projections and forecasts of future events.
• Prepare maps.
• Gather and disseminate information and intelligence for use in
the IAP.

Documentation Unit

• Maintain accurate and complete incident files, including a
complete record of major steps taken to resolve the incident.
• File, maintain, and store incident files for legal, analytical, and
historical purposes.
• Prepare the IAP.

Demobilization Unit

• Develop an Incident Demobilization Plan with specific
instructions for all resources that require demobilization.

Technical Specialists

• Support incident objectives by providing input from their field of
expertise.

4.1.6 Logistics Section
The Logistics Section is activated to coordinate all activities for support to
incident personnel. This section is usually necessary for long-term or extended
operations (FEMA, 1998) in which significant resources and provisions are required to
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support the personnel assigned to the response effort. The major activities can be
grouped in six basic units if required, as shown in Figure 4.7. Responsibilities
assigned to each of the units are outlined in Table 4.5. When the resources and
facilities utilized by the Logistics Section are considerable, units can be grouped
under two basic branches, a Service Branch that comprises the Communications
Unit, the Medical Unit, and the Food Unit, and a Support Branch that includes the
Supply Unit, the Facilities Unit, and the Ground Support Unit. This alternative
organization is shown in Figure 4.8.
A Logistics Section Chief is designated once the Logistics Section is activated by
the IC. The Chief’s major responsibilities are listed in Table 4.3.

LOGISTICS
SECTION
Supply Unit

Food Unit

Ground Support Unit

Communications Unit

Facilities Unit

Medical Unit

FIGURE 4.7 – Logistics Section Breakdown (DHS, 2004b)
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TABLE 4.5 – Logistics Section Unit Tasks (DHS, 2004b; OSHA, 2004)
Logistics Section Unit

Responsibilities

Supply Unit

• Order, receive, store, distribute, and process all incidentrelated resources, personnel, and supplies.
• Maintain inventory of supplies and equipment.

Ground Support Unit

• Maintain and repair primary tactical equipment, vehicles, and
mobile ground support equipment.
• Record usage time for all ground equipment.
• Supply fuel for mobile equipment.
• Provide transportation in support of incident operations.

Facilities Unit

• Set up, maintain, and demobilize all facilities used in support
of incident operations including the ICP, incident base, and
camps.

Food Unit

• Determine food and water requirements.
• Provide food and water services for incident personnel.

Communications Unit

• Develop the Communication Plan to make the most effective
use of the communication equipment and facilities in the
context of a multiagency incident.
• Install, maintain, and repair communications equipment.

Medical Unit

• Provide all medical services required by incident personnel.

LOGISTICS
SECTION
Service Branch

Support Branch

Communications
Unit

Supply Unit

Medical Unit

Facilities Unit

Food Unit

Ground Support Unit

FIGURE 4.8 – Logistics Section Branched Breakdown (DHS, 2004b)
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4.1.7 Finance/Administration Section
Many incidents may require careful management of all financial and
administrative aspects of the response, especially for reimbursement purposes.
When this is the case, the IC may activate the Finance/Administration Section. This
section is not always required, as many incidents may need only a technical
specialist at the Planning Section that can handle all cost-related activities (DHS,
2004b; OSHA, 2004). When the Finance/Administration Section is in fact activated, a
Section Chief is assigned with specific responsibilities as illustrated in Table 4.3. The
Finance/Administrations Section can be broken down in units as shown in Figure 4.9.
Each of these units is assigned with the tasks outlined in Table 4.6.

FINANCE/ADMINISTRATION
SECTION

Compensation/Claims Unit

Procurement Unit

Cost Unit

Time Unit

FIGURE 4.9 – Finance/Administration Section Breakdown (DHS, 2004b)
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TABLE 4.6 – Finance/Administration Section Unit Tasks (DHS, 2004b;
OSHA, 2004)
Finance/Administration

Responsibilities

Section Unit
Cost Unit

• Provide cost analysis for the incident.
• Record all cost data.
• Analyze and prepare estimates of incident costs.

Compensation/Claims Unit

• Handle injury compensation and claims including all
necessary forms required by local agencies.

Procurement Unit

• Coordinate with local jurisdictions to identify sources for
equipment.
• Prepare and sign equipment rental agreements.
• Process all administrative requirements associated with
equipment rental and supply contracts.

Time Unit

• Ensure proper daily recording of personnel time in
accordance with the policies of the relevant agencies.

4.1.8 Area Command
According to the NIMS (DHS, 2004b), the general purpose of an Area Command
(AC) is to oversee the management of multiple incidents that are handled by
separate ICS organizations (DHS, 2004b). For example, situations in which incidents
occur simultaneously in different geographic locations may require several ICS to be
implemented by emergency responders. Furthermore, if the incidents are of the
same type, the different ICS response structures may compete for the same
resources. In these situations, an AC is activated as a way to coordinate activities
and prioritize the allocation of resources to avoid conflicts between the different ICS
organizations (see Figure 2.5). Table 4.7 summarizes the responsibilities assigned to
an AC once activated according to the NIMS.
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TABLE 4.7 – Area Command Responsibilities
Area Command Responsibilities
• Sets overall incident-related priorities.
• Allocates critical resources according to the established priorities.
• Ensures that incidents are properly managed.
• Ensures effective communications.
• Ensures that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or
with agency policies.
• Identifies critical resource needs.
• Provides for personnel accountability and a safe operating environment.

An AC operates under the same basic principles as the ICS, but does not have
operational responsibilities (DHS, 2004b). Figure 4.10 shows a typical Area
Command structure as stated by NIMS. It consists of an Area Commander, a
Planning section, a Logistics section, and a series of support positions that are
activated when required. Each of these positions is responsible for performing certain
tasks that ensure overall coordination of the multiple ICS structures activated.
The Area Commander is responsible for the overall management of the multiple
ICS systems under the supervision of the AC. The Commander’s responsibilities
include ensuring that possible conflicts are resolved, that a set of overall incident
objectives are established, and that strategies are selected for the use of critical
resources (DHS, 2004b). He/she is also the individual responsible for coordinating
with external organizations involved in the response (i.e., Federal, State, and local
entities).
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AREA COMMANDER
(AC)

PLANNING SECTION

LOGISTICS SECTION

SUPPORT POSITIONS

Critical Resources Unit Leader
Situation Unit Leader
Public Information Officer
Liaison Officer

Figure 4.10 – Area Command Structure (DHS, 2004b)

The AC Planning Section is responsible for collecting information from the
multiple ICS organizations to assess and evaluate potential conflicts among them
(DHS, 2004b). This includes resolving conflicts that may arise in the allocation of
critical resources for the overall response objectives.
The AC Logistics section, on the other hand, is responsible for all services and
materials required at the AC level, and more important, for the effective allocation of
critical resources and supplies among the multiple ICS structures (DHS, 2004b).
As mentioned before, a series of support positions can be activated when
necessary. As shown in Figure 4.10, these may include a Critical Resources Unit
Leader, a Situation Unit Leader, a Public Information Officer, and a AC Liaison
Officer. According to NIMS (DHS, 2004b), the Critical Resources Unit Leader is
activated to track and maintain the status and availability of critical resources
assigned to each incident under the AC. The Situation Unit Leader, on the other
hand, monitors the status of objectives for each incident or incident management
teams (ICS structures) assigned to the AC (DHS, 2004b). The Public Information
Officer is activated to coordinate all public information that may be released by the
different ICS organizations, and is the point of contact for the media at the AC level
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(DHS, 2004b). Finally, the Liaison Officer helps maintain off-incident interagency
contacts and coordination.

4.1.9 ICS and DOTs
The previous sections highlighted the basic principles surrounding the ICS
concept. As mentioned before, ICS is currently considered as the most appropriate
emergency response system and is the standard organizational structure employed
by emergency responders. Initiatives like NIMS and the NRP have expanded the use
of ICS across emergency management agencies and have highlighted the need for
these agencies to adopt the system.
The involvement transportation agencies can have in emergency response efforts
has led some agencies to use ICS for their specific purposes. Today, many transit
agencies like the Bay Area Rapid Transit in San Francisco, the New York City Transit,
and the Long Island Rail Road among others use ICS to manage and coordinate their
activities with first responders (Boyd and Sullivan, 2000). In a similar way, many
DOTs across the nation have seen in ICS a valuable tool to organize both their
internal and external emergency response functions.
For the purpose of this research, it was important to have a better understanding
of the applications the Incident Command System currently has in other State DOTs.
Particular attention was placed in obtaining information on current applications and
how common these were among Departments of Transportation. In this way, in
addition to contacting directly many DOTs via telephone or e-mail, specific questions
regarding the use of ICS were included in both the ICS Survey and the AASHTO
Security Forum survey conducted for this study.
A basic conclusion that was drawn from this exercise is that ICS is a common
practice among DOTs. As shown in Figure 4.11, 20 out of the 26 States (77%) who
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responded to the surveys said they currently use the ICS (or a modified version of
ICS) for responding to large-scale emergencies, while only four (15%) said they do
not. However, two of these said that, although they do not currently employ ICS,
they expect to adopt it in the future when complying with the NIMS.

Does your DOT use a version of the Incident Command System as
your operational structure for responding to large-scale terrorist
events or natural disasters?
8%
15%

77%
Y

N

N/A

*Based on information
provided by 26 states.

FIGURE 4.11 – ICS in State DOTs

The ICS is being used by State DOTs in two ways. First, its organizational
structure and basic principles are used as a tool to coordinate and manage response
efforts within the DOT. Once an emergency is declared, a pre-defined ICS
organizational structure following the principles outlined in this chapter is activated
accordingly within the DOT to handle the incident until the event is considered to be
under control. All internal activities necessary to handle the emergency are managed
within this ICS structure.
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Second, because DOT personnel may be asked to perform response activities
under the ICS activated by first responders at the incident, many DOTs have
required their personnel to have basic training on ICS. In this way, DOT personnel
assigned to the incident can integrate more easily with first responders and
understand how they operate, thus solving a significant problem that has been
observed in emergencies in the past (AASHTO, 2002a).

4.2 Communications
Communications play a key role in emergency response. Once an emergency has
occurred, large amounts of information from a number of sources have to be
effectively relayed among the responding parties to coordinate overall efforts.
However, especially after 9/11, significant issues have been observed in the
appropriateness of the communication systems, the technologies employed, and the
procedures used by emergency personnel to disseminate emergency related
information during an incident. In addition, the new terrorist framework of
operations highlighted new considerations such as the redundancy of the systems
and the need to prevent sensitive information from being available to the wrong
hands. Because transportation agencies may play a crucial role in emergency
response, it is important for INDOT to revise and review its current communications
systems and procedures to assure they are appropriate to function in the event of a
major disaster. This section summarizes some of the current communication issues
and technologies found by the research team that are currently being discussed and
implemented by emergency response agencies in the US.
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4.2.1 Interoperability
Emergency response is a coordinated effort among a number of responding
agencies. Although many of these agencies do not work together under normal
conditions, they have to be able to communicate appropriately in the case of an
emergency. This has become one of the most important challenges in emergency
management, because many agencies’ communications systems are not
interoperable (9/11 Commission, 2004; AASHTO, 2002a; MIPT, 2004). The lack of
interoperability may include not only the absence of incompatible technologies, but
also discordant communication procedures and plans employed by the different
agencies.
In many cases, including the response efforts in New York City after the attacks
of 9/11, different agencies from different jurisdictions may use different
communications technologies that become an obstacle when trying to disseminate
information (9/11 Commission, 2004). Although this problem has been addressed in
many jurisdictions, it is most likely that equipment from different jurisdictions is not
interoperable (e.g., the county equipment may not communicate with the city
equipment) (MIPT, 2004). In addition, the communication technology that is used
effectively in normal operations may not be appropriate when trying to integrate
activities and operate after large-scale incidents that may require special equipment.
For example, it was observed that one of the major problems in the emergency
response for 9/11 in New York City was the inability of the radio systems used by
first responders to reach the personnel located in the top floors of the World Trade
Center (9/11 Commission, 2004).
In other cases, the communication procedures used are not consistent among the
different parties involved. For example, different agencies in the same jurisdictions
may have the same radio frequencies assigned. Even though this may be considered
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an acceptable practice in normal operations, in a large scale emergency this may
result in congested channels and unintelligible communications (9/11 Commission,
2004). Another example is the discordant terminology used in radio transmissions.
Different agencies may use different radio coding and refer to the same thing in a
different way. This may become an obstacle when trying to communicate properly
among them.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the DHS has put significant effort into trying to
standardize practices among emergency responders in the US. The NIMS and NRP
have highlighted the need to standardize communications systems and procedures
among agencies. In this way, the NIMS Integration Center is expected to release in
the near future a set of standards to normalize communications among responders.
(Refer to Section 2.2.4.) These standards will include specifications of
communication systems and technology required to assure interoperability (DHS,
2004b; MIPT, 2004). To ensure proper communications ability, the infrastructure has
to be such that it is compatible with equipment of other response agencies.
On the other hand, adopting the ICS as the standard system for emergency
response resolves many issues of lack of interoperability. As mentioned in Section
4.1, one of the main principles of ICS is the adoption of common terminology among
agencies (e.g., common names for all resources and radio transmissions in plain
English without codes) and the integration of all communications (e.g., common
communications plan, use of standard operating procedures, and common
frequencies) (FEMA, 1998). By adopting the ICS and its principles, it is expected that
many of the issues of non-interoperability can be resolved.
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4.2.2 Information Assurance
Communications systems are the backbone of emergency response. Without a
communication system, information can not be disseminated among the first
responders and among the different agencies involved in the overall response
initiative. With this in mind, one of the most important concerns for agencies to
consider is the ability to have a reliable communications system, that is, one that is
not likely to fail when it is most needed. The new terrorist threat has emphasized the
importance of this concern, because agencies have to acknowledge the fact that
communications systems themselves can be the target of an attack.
In this way, agencies should not only contemplate having communications
systems with reasonably low vulnerability, but systems that can also operate and
build upon a number of different technologies, like radio, hard-line phone, cell phone,
fax, e-mail, and text messaging. For example, if in a large-scale incident the radio
system becomes unavailable or inoperable, agencies may still communicate with
their personnel via cell phones. The system has to be redundant enough that the
possibility of failures during operations are reduced to the maximum extent possible,
even if there is an attack on the communications system itself.
In addition to the above, 9/11 emphasized the need for emergency response
agencies to reconsider the fact that some of the information handled during (and
sometimes prior to) an incident might be classified. Agencies have to be able to
communicate effectively in a way that does not compromise the confidentiality and
integrity of the information (MIPT, 2004). It is important to ensure that any classified
information is available only to the qualified personnel who need this information for
their operations. In this way, emergency agencies may need to update their
communications procedures to consider this issue appropriately. This may include
establishing SOPs for the treatment of sensitive information. If some information is
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considered to be classified, SOPs can guide personnel as to how this should be
handled.
With this in mind, emergency response agencies may consider implementing
some sort of user authentication system embedded in their communications systems
and procedures. User authentication technologies have been developed for many
applications (e.g., biometrics). Although it is expected to happen in the near future,
these technologies are yet to be implemented in the communications systems
commonly used in emergency response, like radios (MIPT, 2004). The use of
biometric technology for identification is still considered to be relatively expensive.
The current state of the practice is to provide authentication in radios with identifiers
that allow personnel to know exactly what radios are being operated. However, this
authentication system is vulnerable if the radios are lost or stolen (MIPT, 2004).

4.2.3 Lines of Communication and Notification Procedures
When communicating during an emergency, personnel have to be able to identify
exactly who needs to be contacted and what procedures to follow to reach those
contacts. In order to reduce improvisation, loss of valuable time, and confusion
during actual emergency response, lines of communications can be defined prior to
the incident as part of a preparedness effort. In this way, depending on the incident
at hand, emergency personnel can know beforehand exactly what persons need to
be contacted (both within the organization as well as externally), the information
that needs to be relayed, and the way in which the contact should be made (radio,
cell phone, etc.).
Based on the information gathered from State DOTs across the US, two basic
practices are being adopted by transportation agencies to ensure proper
communications practices for emergency response: (1) the adoption and application
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of the ICS, and (2) the development of Standard Operating Procedures for
communications of emergency information.
The ICS is a system that can help deal with some of these issues because it
clearly defines an organizational hierarchy to be followed during a specific incident.
In addition, the concept of Unity of Command mentioned in section 4.1 ensures that
emergency personnel have a clear understanding of who they need to report to and
the specific role and responsibilities of each of the components of the ICS structure.
Establishing SOPs for communications is also a good practice in emergency
response (FEMA and USFA, 2000). In this case, SOPs may identify the exact
procedures to follow given a certain emergency condition, including the personnel
that needs to be contacted, the way in which it can be contacted (e.g., phone
numbers), and the information that needs to be transmitted. According to the
responses obtained from the AASHTO Security Forum survey, many State DOTs have
developed or updated their SOPs to include notification procedures to be followed by
DOT personnel. These SOPs are developed as a way to guide personnel through the
specific steps required to communicate emergency related information, including how
to report threats or any suspicious activities.
A common practice among emergency response agencies is the use of
Emergency Notification Systems (ENS) to expedite the dissemination of emergency
information. The use of ENS has been a common practice of 911 dispatch centers for
years (911 Broadcast, 2004). In the simplest form, ENS consist of a central
computer station in which a series of predefined call lists are activated by an
operator once an emergency has occurred. The individuals included in the call lists
are then contacted automatically by the system and given the desired information.
Current Emergency Notification Systems on the market are capable of delivering and
tracking the information relayed. In this way, a pre-recorded voice message with the
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information can be delivered to the person included in the call list only if the
individual answers the phone. After several attempts, the ENS will automatically try
to make the contact with a secondary phone number if provided, and will keep track
of who has received the message and who has not. This information is available to
the user to make the necessary adjustments he/she considers appropriate. Many
ENS can also be activated by the user over the phone, or access them via the
internet (911 Broadcast, 2004; Microsoft, 2005).
Although ENS were originally conceived to support emergency management
agencies, they are now applied in a variety of fields. Companies like the US Postal
Service and AT&T have implemented ENS-type systems to support their operations
(911 Broadcast, 2004). Emergency Notification Systems are also used by some
schools to automatically disseminate any emergency-related information to school
members and faculty. The research team found a number of ENS software
applications available in the market today. Companies like Dialogic Communications,
InterAct Public Safety Systems, Positron Public Safety Systems, and Virtual Alert Inc.
offer software Windows-based applications to implement ENS for essentially any
application (Microsoft, 2005).

4.3 Intelligent Transportation Systems - ITS
With the swift evolution of technologies in fields such as communications and
electronics, and these becoming more accessible, their application in the
transportation field has become increasingly common in transportation agencies
across the US. The application of such technologies, referred to as Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS), is aimed towards enhancing the operation and
improving the efficiency of the transportation system. Examples of common ITS
applications include:
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•

Advanced Traveler Information Systems that provide information directly to
travelers, enabling them to make better route choices.

•

Advanced Traffic Management Systems that employ a variety of detectors,
sensors, and communication systems to monitor traffic in real-time.

•

Incident Management Systems that use sensing technologies and detection
devices that empower operators to respond quickly to accidents and other
emergencies within the system (ITS America, 2005).

The events of 9/11 and the potential terrorist threat to the Nation’s
transportation system have stressed the appropriateness and importance of ITS as
an effective tool to respond to Homeland Security incidents, even for cases in which
the target of the attacks is not the transportation system itself. The use of ITS and
ITS-related data has been proven to be a valuable resource for emergency response
agencies in large scale incidents (e.g., Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles in 1994
and the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington) (ITS America and USDOT, 2002).
A year after the events of 9/11, ITS America and the US Department of
Transportation released Homeland Security and ITS, a document that presents new
applications and special considerations of ITS to effectively manage terrorist events.
This document builds from the fact that ITS can be applied by agencies to enhance
capabilities in all stages of emergency management (Franklin, 2004; ITS America
and USDOT, 2002) namely, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. It
outlines the way in which transportation agencies can consider this new threat in
their current and future ITS applications. Although it can be difficult to refer to only
one of these elements without making reference to the others, for the purpose of
this research we focused specifically on those ITS initiatives intended to enhance
highway emergency response.

88

As has been stated throughout this document, transportation agencies play a
supportive role in the overall emergency management effort by performing tasks as
required by the characteristics of the event. However, performing these supportive
duties appropriately requires significant efforts both within the organization as well
as with a number of external agencies. Intelligent Transportation Systems can be a
very valuable tool to satisfy both of these requirements.

4.3.1 ITS and Emergency Response
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the unique characteristics of the transportation
system make it especially vulnerable to the occurrence of major emergencies,
including terrorist incidents. The transportation system will always be affected
somehow, even if it is not the actual target of the attacks. While people may need to
be evacuated out of the area affected by the incident, emergency responders need to
arrive promptly at the incident site to undertake their activities. The transportation
system plays a key role, because it is the means by which both of these tasks are
performed. Its efficient operation becomes imperative during disasters.
Emergency management agencies and first responders can benefit significantly
from the information that ITS technologies can obtain from the field on the status of
the system. ITS can also allow these to benefit from the possibility of adapting the
system to the ongoing situation and support emergency response as it evolves.
Although there exists a number of technologies that can be developed and
implemented to support emergency response, it is important to highlight the fact
that many of the existing ITS capabilities and infrastructure used for incident and
traffic management may be directly applicable to enhance emergency management
both directly within the transportation agency, as well as to support other agencies
in their response activities (ITS America and USDOT, 2002). However, it is important
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for transportation agencies not only to develop and adopt standard emergency
procedures that guide the use of ITS during emergencies, but also to understand
clearly how incidents are managed and how other agencies may benefit from ITS
(Franklin, 2004; ITS America and USDOT, 2002). It is important to have the
technologies available during the emergency, but it is vital to understand how they
can be used to obtain the maximum benefit from them.
Many current ITS capabilities can be very useful during emergency response.
Cameras and detection devices installed along freeways and major highways to
monitor traffic can be used to support response activities within the transportation
agency, as well as the activities of other actors involved. They can be used as a way
to monitor the status of the transportation system during the response efforts,
allowing operators to adjust the system in real-time as the events unfold (Franklin,
2004; ITS America and USDOT, 2002). This information can be relayed to
emergency management agencies to support and coordinate all response activities.
When an incident occurs, emergency management agencies need to be able to
communicate effectively to the public. Transportation agencies need to communicate
to the users of the transportation system to inform them of the status of the current
events and that of the transportation system itself. Communication with the public
allows users of the system to make more knowledgeable decisions on what routes to
take and avoid, and enables the agency to gain control and adapt the system to the
evolving situation (e.g., prioritize traffic on evacuation routes).
The use of Dynamic Message Signs (DMS) to display information to the users on
the status of the transportation system is currently a common practice for traffic
management among transportation agencies. In large scale events, DMS can be also
utilized to display emergency information to the users of the system. Nevertheless,
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there needs to be a very careful and conscientious use of these systems when
displaying security related information.
The FHWA has approved the use of DMS to display security related information
by following standards similar to those established for other types of messages.
However, it conditions this practice on the existence of policies and procedures that
control the messages that are to be displayed (Paniati, 2003). According to the
FHWA, these policies and procedures need to address a series of issues prior to
implementation, such as (Paniati, 2003):
o

The criteria under which DMS will be used for emergency or security
messages, including the necessary coordination with public safety or security
agencies.

o

Protocols or hierarchy for prioritizing messages and determining which
messages are to be displayed.

o

Geographic area over which the information is to be displayed, to be
determined in cooperation with public safety and security agencies.

o

Identification of the circumstances under which transportation-related
messages, such as lane closures, fog alerts, detours, or other messages that
may be needed because of dangerous travel conditions in the immediate
vicinity, would preempt emergency or security alert messages.

o

The criteria that would cause the discontinuation of use of the DMS if the
emergency or security alert message creates an adverse traffic impact, such
as queues and markedly slowing traffic.
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When applying ITS technologies to support security and emergency response,
two basic issues emerge:
1. There is a need for transportation agencies to coordinate their activities with
other agencies involved in the response efforts.
2. ITS-related information should be shared with other participating agencies to
enhance emergency response.

Because ITS are usually implemented and operated by transportation agencies,
the dissemination of ITS-information to/from other emergency response agencies
constitutes one of the major obstacles to overcome. This obstacle is further
aggravated when there is not a clear prior relationship between the agencies.
Transportation agencies operating the transportation system may not be aware of
what other emergency agencies are doing and will not know what information from
ITS can be useful to support their activities. If no coordination exists, responding
agencies may not even be aware of the wealth of information available to
transportation agencies from ITS technologies.
The following section presents a way in which some local and state governments
are currently attempting to reduce the gap between transportation agencies and
emergency management agencies during a disaster.

4.3.2 Integration of Traffic Management Centers (TMC) and Emergency Operations
Centers (EOC)
Intelligent Transportation Systems can be a very valuable tool to support
emergency response for large scale events. However, due to a number of factors,
transportation agencies that operate ITS normally have little interaction with
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emergency management agencies in command for incident response (Hedden and
Witzke, 2002). This translates into poor coordination between the two parties.
In order to overcome this obstacle, many local and State governments have
considered the practice of integrating local and/or State EOCs and TMCs into one
common facility where resources are shared between the two entities. This
integration is considered to benefit both agencies and can enhance overall
emergency response because it may (Hedden and Witzke, 2002, ITE and FHWA,
2004, ITE, 2004):
o

Improve access to additional and better information for both EOC and TMC.

o

Improve coordination of operations through day-to-day interaction of EOC
and TMC personnel. This will translate into better coordination during
emergency response.

o

Reduce redundancies in infrastructure as both systems operate in the same
facility.

o

Reduce costs and duplication of efforts. To a large extent, the information and
communications systems needed to operate each facility are fairly similar.

However, a major funding issue obstructs the feasibility of integrating both
facilities. Not only are the sources of funding different, but the sizes of the budgets
can be considerably unequal. Local EOCs may get funding from local governments,
while a TMC may obtain resources from local, State, or Federal sources (Hedden and
Witzke, 2002). In this way, sharing costs for the implementation and operation of an
integrated EOC-TMC facility may be somewhat complicated.
Hedden and Witzke (2002) present two case studies on efforts to integrate EOCs
and TMCs. The first case presented is the integration of Chicago’s 911 call center
(OEC) and the Chicago Traffic Management Center (CTMC). The second case is an
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initiative taken by the Emergency Management Agency of Franklin County (EMAFC)
in Columbus, Ohio and the Central Ohio Regional Transportation and Emergency
Management Center (CORTRAN). For the purpose of this research, it is important to
expand somewhat on the second case.
As with most local Emergency Management Agencies, the EMAFC is in charge of
developing emergency procedures and plans for the Franklin County region,
especially those that deal with response to natural disasters. Due to continuing
limitations in space, the EMAFC had considered the possibility of incorporating their
facility into the City of Columbus EOC. At the same time, transportation planners
were considering the development of a regional TMC in the area. In this way, both
parties came together and decided to combine efforts by creating a joint facility in
which all activities could be integrated. This facility is known as CORTRAN and
includes the participation of a number of agencies as shown in Table 4.8.
The integration favored both parties. On one hand, the EMAFC is now able to
access information that was previously not available to them. For example, they can
now access all cameras and DMS installed along the region’s highway system to
support their operations (Hedden and Witzke, 2002). The TMC on the other hand,
improved their ability to coordinate their activities with local and regional emergency
management agencies.
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TABLE 4.8 – CORTRAN Participating Groups (Hedden and Witzke, 2002;
MORPC, 2005)
Agency/Group

Participation

Ohio DOT

Columbus Metropolitan Freeway Management
System

Franklin Co. Engineer

County and Suburban Traffic Signals and
County Snow Plow Operations

Central Ohio Transit Authority

Radio Room and Dispatching Facility

City of Columbus, Public Service Department

City Traffic Signals
Traveler/construction information.
City Snowplow Operations

City of Columbus, Public Safety Department

Emergency Operations Center

Franklin Co. Emergency Management Agency

4.4 Decision Support Systems
During an emergency, a large amount of information and data from a number of
different sources may be available to responders. Based on this information and the
training previously received, responders need to make the most appropiate decisions
for the situation at hand in a limited amount of time. Resources have to be deployed
in the most efficient way possible. However, how many and what resources should
be deployed so to not compromise other operations? From what location should they
be deployed? Who needs to be contacted given the present emergency conditions?
Where and how can they be contacted? Exactly what information needs to be
communicated? What is the standard procedure to follow for this type of emergency?
This decision-making process can be extremely complicated, especially when it
has to be performed in real-time and under significant pressure. However, these
characteristics are not unique to emergency response. Many other situations in which
real-time decisions are required share many of the same limitations. As stated by
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Laffey (Laffey, 1991), real-time problem solving tends to exaggerate many human
limitations such as:
•

Tendencies to overlook relevant information.

•

Tendencies to respond inconsistently, to respond too slowly, or to panic
when the rate of information is too great.

•

Fail to effectively monitor all available information.

•

Inability to resolve conflicting constraints.

•

Cannot provide a solution quickly enough.

Since the advancement of computers and computing power in the late 1960’s,
researchers have been trying to imitate human behavior to support their activities in
what is known today as the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Power, 2004). In
this way, many emergency agencies have sought AI as a way to cope with the
problem of decision-making during incidents, specifically to what is referred to as
Decision Support Systems (DSS). DSS are computer-based systems developed to
support human decisions by processing data provided as input from the exterior, and
presenting the user with a set of proposed decisions based on the information
supplied. The operator can then make use of the decisions provided by the system to
make his/her own judgment. Figure 4.12 shows a representation of the logic around
DSS.

INPUT

OPERATOR/
EXTERIOR

OUTPUT

DECISION
SUPPORT
SYSTEM

PROPOSED
DECISION

Figure 4.12 – Decision Support System Diagram
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One of the most common and yet simple DSS implemented today are Expert
Systems (ES). As with DSS, Expert Systems attempt to capture the knowledge and
experience of experts in a specific area into a computer system that can be accessed
by non-experts in a timely manner. The knowledge of the expert is replicated into
the computer by pre-defining a set of simple IF-THEN rules that have to be followed
by the system to arrive at a final conclusion. The ES then interacts with the user by
asking a series of questions. The answers to these questions are the input of the
system. Depending on the answers, the ES will follow the IF-THEN rules and continue
inquiring until a final conclusion can be obtained. Hence, non-experts can make
decisions by emulating the interaction they will have if an actual expert was
physically present.
Developing an ES today is a relatively simple task. In order to establish the set of
IF-THEN rules that define the performance of the ES, the user needs what is referred
to as an ES shell. Fortunately, there are many of these available on the market
today. While some of these applications are offered for free and can be downloaded
directly from the internet, other commercial tools can be quite expensive. These
shells provide the user with the flexibility of creating an ES in relatively simple way.
In order to have a better understanding of how an ES can be developed, the
research team investigated three of these shells: Corvid by Exsys Inc, Flex by Logic
Programming Associates Ltd, and CLIPS, a free ES available in the internet. All of
these shells were observed as being very flexible and relatively simple to use.
However, Flex and Clips required the user to understand programming code in order
to create the ES, which made them somewhat more difficult to develop. While Flex
works in Prolog, Clips has its own programming language. On the other hand, Corvid
comes with a Windows-based layout and a user friendly environment that enables
the user to create the rules much more easily, because no coding is required. In any
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of the cases, however, the conclusion was that the elaboration of a relatively
complicated ES is a moderately simple task.
The use of ES is not new. There are practically thousands of ES today applied in a
wide range of fields. Expert systems have been used for applications from medical
diagnostics to the military, from monitoring the Hubble Space Telescope to
commercial computer costumer support (Laffey, 1991; Slap, Hillman, and Moore,
1988). According to Slap, Hillman, and Moore (1988), expert systems can be
considered by any kind of organization in which:
•

A solution to a problem has a high payoff.

•

Expertise is needed in many locations.

•

Expertise is needed in hostile or hazardous environments.

•

Cost maintaining expertise within the organization is high.

•

Large amount of data must be examined in the decision-making process.

•

An error in the decision-making process could lead to disastrous results.

With the above in mind, it is not surprising to find many ES that have been
developed for emergency response applications. The characteristics of an emergency
and the decisions that have to be made during the response efforts are ideal
scenarios for the implementation of ES (Slap, Hillman, and Moore, 1988). Rules can
be made that include the operating procedures for a predetermined set of emergency
scenarios. Emergency operations plans, which are usually extensive documents, can
be included in an ES in such a way that the user of the system is provided only with
the relevant material required for a specific type of emergency. Sometimes it may
not be appropriate for responders to spend time searching for information as an
incident unfolds (De Vlaminck and Mampaey, 2003). Lines of communications and
notification procedures, as well as contact information, can be stored to guide the
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operator on whom to call and how to reach them. This allows for operators to obtain
this information and guide the response efforts appropriately, even if the operator
has little experience in these types of events. It is also a good solution in situations
in which the personnel normally responsible is not available (e.g., sick or on
vacation). ES can also serve as a way to track and log information, because all data
used during the response can be stored in the system (Slap, Hillman, and Moore,
1988).
ES has also been found valuable as an emergency training tool. Sharit and Chen
(1993) conducted a study that examined how an operator’s knowledge of response
procedures was affected when an ES was used for training purposes, and found that
operators who receive training via ES were better prepared than those who did not.
They concluded that when ES was used, it enhanced the ability of operators to
capture and process the information, because these will follow the same rule-based
structure used in the ES when facing an incident. This was found to be particularly
helpful during emergency response.
With the advancement in technology, ES can now be integrated in large
databases with real-time data acquired directly from sensing devices; optimization
models from the field of operations research (e.g. Hypercube Queuing Model) can be
implemented to guide the operator into making more efficient decisions;
communication systems can be integrated to acquire and distribute information
among responders; weather information can be included; and GIS mapping abilities
among other capabilities to provide the operator with a powerful DSS to be used to
assist during the decision-making process of emergency response. Furthermore,
many DSS today can be web based, allowing multiple operators to access and
update information from remote locations.
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4.4.1 DSS in Emergency Response
A literature review was performed to find applications of DSS developed
especially for emergency response. Although several of such applications were
observed, two major DSS applications are worth mentioning for the purpose of this
research. These are, namely, DSS for monitoring and responding to emergencies in
industrial plants, and DSS for response to hazards and chemical spills. While the first
application is especially relevant as it shows how DSS can be used by responders in
an emergency response control facility, the second demonstrates how DSS can be
applied by personnel to support their field activities.

4.4.1.a DSS for Emergencies in Industrial Plants
Decision Support Systems can be convenient for a number of different
applications in multiple fields. As found in the literature, the use of DSS for
emergency response in industrial plants has been proven to be a very convenient
practice (Delic and Tanaskovic, 1988; Hasbach, 1995; Slap, Hillman, and Moore,
1988). Various papers have been written on this subject, especially during the
1980’s, when several applications were developed for monitoring and guiding
operators during emergencies in large scale industrial plants.
In this type of environment, operators in a control room may have to deal with a
large amount of information coming from automatic sensing devices. Once an
emergency occurs, the operator has to be able to identify exactly what the problem
is and know exactly what to do in order to cope with the emergency effectively.
However, this can sometimes overwhelm the abilities of the operators, because there
may be a vast amount of data coming in from the processes. In addition, for
emergencies that involve the risk of chemical or hazardous materials, it is important
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for the operator to be able to control the incident in a timely manner. In this way,
operators cannot spend time searching for information in manuals or other
references. This can consume valuable time during the response efforts (De Vlaminck
and Mampaey, 2003). For these types of scenarios, many industrial plants have
adopted DSS as a way to enhance their response capabilities.
In the 1980’s and 1990’s, several initiatives were taken to develop DSS to assist
operators of chemical plants during the occurrence of an emergency. Such efforts
resulted in DSS such as PControl (Delic and Tanaskovic, 1988) and PlantSafe by
Geosphere Systems (Hasbach, 1995; Slap, Hillman, and Moore, 1988), developed in
the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, respectively. As an example of how DSS can be
used today in emergency response, a brief description of each of these systems is
presented below.
PControl is a DSS that monitors industrial processes in normal operating
conditions and is capable of suggesting and/or making corrective adjustments to the
system to obtain optimal system performance. The system was developed so that
when unusual operating conditions are present in the system (e.g., unusual
temperatures or pressures), it alerts the operator of the situation and provides
precise information on the specific area of unusual activity. With this information,
PControl asks the operator if an emergency situation is to be declared, or if further
analysis of the information is required (Delic and Tanaskovic, 1988). If an emergency
is declared by the operator, the system automatically alerts the proper personnel in
the plant of the situation via communication devices such as pagers. The operator is
then presented with a series of pre-specified procedures available to cope with the
type of emergency detected by the system, and has to choose one of such
procedures. Once a set of procedures is chosen, PControl automatically follows these
procedures and alerts the operator of any further information available/required.
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Once the emergency is under control, PControl will notify the personnel that the
emergency is under control and will resume normal operations. In summary, a DSS
like PControl is capable of identifying the problem, determining the extent of the
problem, and executing corrective measures to handle the incident (Delic and
Tanaskovic, 1988).
In the early 1990’s, an ES called PlantSafe was developed to assist chemical
plant operators in the event of an emergency (Hasbach, 1995). The rule-based
expert system, which guided operators through emergency procedures as the
situation developed, was complemented by information from gas dispersion models,
digital maps, building and tank information, personnel records, notification lists, and
other information valuable for emergency response (Slap, Hillman, and Moore,
1988). The system was developed as a way for operators to have better control of
emergencies by providing the most complete information and tools for them to make
knowledgeable decisions. In this way, information was readily available in a simple to
use computer program rather than stashed away in filing cabinets or emergency
plans (Hasbach, 1995). According to the PlantSafe website (CSM Inc, 2004), the
system is currently implemented in chemical plants of major companies like Dow,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Rohm and Haas, Dupont, and Shell, and has been proven to be
successful in their operations.
The PlantSafe system, originally designed for chemical plants, has been further
developed into a Windows-NT-based system called 4Command that is now available
for application by any organization that requires decision-making support in their
operations. Figure 4.13 below shows a screen capture of the user interface of the
4Command system. The system consists of a series of windows for different
purposes. The Cue Window at the bottom left is the interaction between the actual
expert system and the operator. Data can also be automatically obtained by the
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system through sensing devices. The 4Command system includes a knowledge base
builder tool that enables the user to build particular sets of rules according to the
specific application. Based on the options selected in the Cue Window, the system
presents a set of recommendations for the operator to perform in the
Recommendations Window. The operator will choose which of these actions to
perform. The Status Board Window presents a continuous description of the status of
the system (CSM Inc, 2004) by enabling the operator to observe and modify
previous recommendations and decisions. It also keeps track of the different actions
already performed and the time and date these were taken. Finally, the Mapping
Window provides relevant drawings and maps for the operator to use during the
emergency. Other information such as emergency procedures and plans can also be
accessed through the system with the click of a mouse.
The 4Command system can be coupled with an automated notification system
offered by the developers called TeleSafe (CSM Inc, 2004; Slap, Hillman, and Moore,
1988). This system enables the operator to automatically contact and alert the
proper personnel included in pre-defined contact lists. The operator records the
message and once it is delivered, can monitor the status of the calls (e.g., which of
them were successfully received and which of them were not).
As can be seen from these two examples, DSS can be a very powerful tool to
assist response activities by emergency control centers. DSS allows operators to
manage emergencies in a more timely and effective way. Responders are provided
with recommendations that guide them through the specific activities that need to be
performed, reducing the possibility of human mistakes during incident response
efforts. They can also reduce the time of response, because they can provide the
operator with a significant amount of information otherwise difficult to obtain if at all
available.
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FIGURE 4.13 – PlantSafe - 4Command Screenshot (CSM Inc, 2004)

4.4.1.b. DSS for Response to Hazardous Material Spills
Another common DSS application found in the literature for emergency purposes
was that for response to hazardous material spills. In these types of emergencies,
the first minutes of the response efforts are especially critical. First responders need
to be able to take the appropriate actions as rapidly as possible without
compromising their own safety or that of the surrounding community. Due to the
vast number of different chemicals and hazardous agents that can travel through the
transportation system today, identifying the specific hazardous material in question
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can be particularly difficult. However, many of the first responders that attend these
incidents are not experts and still have to be able to take the proper measures to
control the emergency (Lin and Biswas, 1991). In many cases, response efforts
have to be delayed until experts arrive at the scene to assess the situation. This
delay may be crucial for the success of the response and may increase the risk of
undesirable consequences. A common application of expert systems, which
addresses the problem of identifying and treating chemical agents during
emergencies, was found in the literature review.
In these type of incidents, an ES can be of significant value to emergency
responders, because response efforts will vary according to the agent present. For
example, fires where chemical materials are involved are treated in different ways
depending on the type of substance. However, identifying the material involved and
the procedures that need to be followed to control the situation can be a difficult
task. Expert systems have been found to be especially valuable in these cases,
because they can assist responders in the identification of these materials and
provide them with specific measures to follow to control the emergency. For
example, ES can assist emergency responders in answering questions such as
(Hushon, 1986):
•

Which of the chemicals present represents the greatest human health hazard?

•

What is the critical exposure route (e.g., inhalation)?

•

If there is fire, what is the best extinguishing material?

•

What equipment should be worn by personnel to protect against the
chemicals present?

•

Should population evacuation be considered?

•

Is there a possibility of explosion?
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•

What are the likely symptoms of chemical poisoning from the substances
present?

Many ES applications that assist responders in answering these types of
questions were found in the literature (Hasbach, 1995; Hushon, 1986; Lin and
Biswas, 1991; Rao, 1990; Wilson, Cantin, and Bisson, 1990). These types of ES are
designed to be used by emergency personnel in the field. Most of the ES reviewed
worked under the same basic structure. Given a certain hazardous spill, responders
can access an ES by means of portable computer devices such as laptops or PDAs.
The DSS queries responders on specific characteristics observed in the incident (e.g.,
is a fire present,or what is the flame color?) and based on the responder’s answers,
defines the particular type of chemical involved. The DSS then guides the responder
on the appropriate procedures and protective measures that need to be considered
for the agent in question based on the evidence provided.
For example, an ES found for hazardous spills called EMERG includes the
following characteristics (Lin and Biswas, 1991):
•

Guidelines for identification of the spilled material

•

Provides the material properties

•

Predicts the chemical concentration profile in the vicinity of a spill.

•

Selects personal protective equipment.

•

Recommends actions to handle the emergency

•

Reports to the appropriate authorities

As can be seen by the previous example, the use of ES by field response
personnel can be very beneficial. Decision Support Systems can provide non-experts
in the field with information they could only obtain with the physical presence of a
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specialist. Instead of having to wait for such specialist to arrive at the scene,
responders equipped with DSS can obtain quick expert information on the field,
reducing response time and the possible consequences related.

4.4.2 DSS in State DOTs
Decision Support Systems have been implemented in the field of emergency
management for some years now. The two applications presented in Section 4.4.1
were merely examples of current applications of DSS in emergency response that
illustrate how these relatively simple systems can enhance the capability of
emergency responders. However, DSS can and have been applied in a number of
different areas as tools to assist decision makers in the performance of various tasks.
With this in mind, and considering the activities and responsibilities that
transportation agencies are normally required to perform for emergencies, DSS
appears to be an applicable and convenient tool for DOTs to support their incident
operations.
For the purpose of this project, the research team investigated on current DSS
applications in this area by State DOTs. A question regarding the use of DSS was
included in the AASHTO Security Forum survey. The results are shown in Figure
4.14.
From the seventeen State DOTs that responded the questionnaire, ten (59%)
responded they did not use any type of computer-based DSS to support their
operations. Of these, only New Mexico DOT mentioned they had considered the use
of such a system but after an evaluation they had finally decided not to develop one.
Five State DOTs (29%) said they did have some kind of DSS. However, none of
these DSS were developed specifically for the DOT to support their internal
organization for emergency response. All of the DOTs that answered affirmatively
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said the systems they use (or will use) are those provided by their respective State
Emergency Management Agencies. These systems, more than a DSS per se, are
what are referred to in emergency management as Crisis Information Management
Software (CIMS). CIMS are powerful computer-based tools used by many local or
State EOC to manage all incident operations, including resource management,
communications, information management, and incident follow-up (ICS status) (NIJ,
2002). In an effort to integrate activities in emergency response, many State
Emergency Management Agencies provide responding agencies access to these
CIMS. Some of these CIMS can be web-based, so information coming to and from
these agencies can be shared among them in real-time, without them having to be
together in a common facility.

Does your DOT use any type of computer-based
decision support system as a tool for emergency
response decision making?
12%
29%

59%
Y

N

N/A

*Based on information
provided by 17 states
(AASHTO forum)

FIGURE 4.14 – DSS State DOT Survey Response

The Department of Justice (NIJ, 2002) recently underwent a study in which ten of
the most common CIMS currently implemented by emergency agencies were
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compared with each other. The most common CIMS found by this study were
Blue292, CRISIS, EM2000, E Team, Incident Master and InfoBook, OpsCenter,
RAMSAFE, RESPONSE, SoftRisk, and WebEOC. In the responses obtained in the
AASHTO forum, Maryland DOT mentioned they had access to WebEOC through the
State EMA, and Oregon DOT said they used OpsCenter in a similar way.
In conclusion, based on the survey responses obtained, it can be said that the
use of DSS by DOTs appears not to be a common practice. Most of the DOTs stated
they did not use (or plan to use) DSS for emergency response. Furthermore, the
systems used by DOTs are those implemented by State EMA for their EOC. There
was no DSS found to be developed and implemented to support the DOT’s internal
activities during emergencies.
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CHAPTER 5 - GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT OF INDOT EMERGENCY
OPERATIONS PLAN

Although INDOT is not an emergency response agency per se, its level of
involvement in emergency operations can be significant. INDOT may be requested by
the State EOC to provide its resources (including personnel) to support emergency
response and recovery efforts. In addition, INDOT has to be prepared to perform and
accomplish the tasks outlined in the Indiana Comprehensive Emergency Management
Plan (CEMP) (see Appendix A). This not only demands that INDOT’s internal
organization be fully prepared to perform these emergency responsibilities
appropriately, but also be able to undertake them in a way that does not jeopardize
its normal operations (e.g., traffic control and snow removal). In addition, INDOT
has to be capable of integrating its activities within the overall statewide emergency
management operations, including the coordination of activities with other State
agencies (e.g., as primary agency of the Transportation Emergency Support Function
in the CEMP).
Emergency response procedures in INDOT have usually evolved from previous
experience in handling emergencies such as snow storms and tornadoes. INDOT
personnel know whom to call and what to do based on procedures normally used
during these types of emergencies. While this practice may have proven to be
effective in the past, the terrorist threat imposed on the nation raises significant
questions as to its appropriateness for emergency response to large scale incidents.
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To enhance its emergency response capabilities, it is imperative for INDOT to
develop and implement an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), as required by the
CEMP (SEMA, 2003). This EOP should initially consist of a written document that
includes all the provisions required and the procedures INDOT personnel at all levels
need to follow when responding to an emergency. As defined by FEMA (1996), an
EOP should describe who will do what, as well as when, with what resources, and by
what authority, before, during, and immediately after an emergency. This chapter
presents a set of guidelines for the development of an EOP by INDOT, following the
current state of the practice at the Federal and State level as presented in Chapters
2 and 3 respectively, and the review of best practices in Chapter 4. These guidelines
are intended to be considered and followed by INDOT in the development of an
internal EOP.

5.1. Considerations for Development of an INDOT EOP
The main objective of developing an EOP for INDOT is to establish all emergency
response procedures and practices prior to an incident, in order to ensure proper
operations during the actual response phase. An EOP should standardize the way
emergency response is performed at the different levels of INDOT’s organization, and
still be flexible enough to be applicable to any type of incident. It should also
consider the important relationship between INDOT and the statewide emergency
management system, and incorporate procedures that will ensure all activities
performed can be integrated and are compatible with emergency practices in
Indiana. In order to accomplish these objectives, a set of emergency management
principles and practices implemented by transportation agencies in the US need to be
included. The following is a compilation of what the research team identified as the
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basic principles and how these can be applied in the development of an EOP for
INDOT.

5.1.1. All-hazards approach
An INDOT EOP should follow an all-hazards approach, one of the most important
principles in emergency management (AASHTO, 2002a; DHS, 2004b; DHS, 2004c;
FEMA, 2004). The basic idea behind this principle is for emergency management
agencies to develop emergency procedures and practices that are applicable for
response to any type of incident. Instead of developing different plans and
procedures to apply for each different type of emergency, agencies develop a
common plan with procedures that are applicable for any case. Specific
considerations that may be required for particular incidents are included in annexes
to the EOP. For example, any specific requirements for response to a terrorist
incident are included in a terrorism specific annex to the EOP. Today, all Federal,
state, and local emergency management agencies in the US are required to
implement the all-hazards principle in their procedures (DHS, 2004b; DHS, 2004c;
FEMA, 1996).

5.1.2 Follow Homeland Security Advisory System
As explained in Section 2.1, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) was
created with the specific objective of establishing a centralized mechanism to
communicate homeland security threat levels to the nation. Although the HSAS is
directed towards Federal departments and agencies, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 3 encourages state and local entities to adopt the HSAS and develop a set
of protective measures that follow the national threat level. Many DOTs have
followed this initiative and established their own protective actions (FHWA, 2002).
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The research team suggests that INDOT develop a set of preventive and protective
actions that considers measures to be taken at all levels of the organization (i.e.,
Central Office, Districts, Subdistricts, TMC) for each level of the HSAS. These
measures are to be included in the INDOT EOP.
The FHWA (2002) developed a survey to obtain information on the specific
measures transportation agencies in the US are taken under the different levels of
the HSAS, and released a compilation of the information obtained. INDOT can build
on the information presented in that report to develop its own set of measures.

5.1.3 Integration and Interoperability
An INDOT EOP must ensure interoperability and proper integration of activities
with the statewide response efforts. As has been stressed throughout this document,
INDOT is just one of several agencies involved with a common response objective.
Emergency response may require INDOT to interact with other state agencies like
the Indiana State Police, SEMA, and the Department of Natural Resources. With this
in mind, procedures included in the INDOT EOP must be compatible with the
activities of other agencies.
In this regard, it is advisable for INDOT to strengthen its relation with SEMA (or
IDHS) to ensure that its practices are compatible and interoperable with other
Indiana agencies. Moreover, INDOT may ask for SEMA (or IDHS) to have a
significant level of involvement when developing the INDOT EOP to further assure its
integration within the State’s practices.

5.1.4 Redundancy and Continuity of Operations
When developing an INDOT EOP, special consideration must be placed on
ensuring a certain level of redundancy in the emergency response capabilities
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defined in the EOP. That is, INDOT must ensure, to some reasonable extent, that it
will be able to perform its response activities even if there is a disruption in the
system. For example, if the radio system is down, a secondary system must be
considered in the EOP to be used as a way to ensure proper communications.
This concept of redundancy is known in emergency management as Continuity of
Operations (COOP). In this framework, emergency agencies must anticipate the
possibility of incidents affecting their essential operations during emergencies, and
should plan accordingly.
For INDOT, special provisions in the EOP should be made to include contingency
procedures due to (1) inability to use facilities, (2) loss of power, (3) loss of
communications, (4) unavailable personnel, or (5) inaccessible information
technology systems (TRB, 2005). Furthermore, the CEMP (SEMA, 2003) mandates
that all Indiana agencies in the state plan incorporate procedures to ensure
continuity of operations. (Refer to Section 5.1.e.)
A joint project between the TCRP and NCHRP (TRB, 2005) that is expected to be
released soon will guide transportation agencies in including and developing COOP
planning into their emergency plans. INDOT should consider using this report in the
future to incorporate COOP into the EOP.

5.1.5 Personnel Safety
Considering that chemical and biological agents may be used in a terrorist
incident, protection of INDOT personnel is to be considered as one of the most
important elements in any emergency. Although INDOT personnel are not expected
to act as first responders, the fact that many of its employees are in continuous
contact with the highway system gives them some risk of exposure. Significant effort
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must be placed when developing an INDOT EOP to consider the safety of INDOT
personnel both prior to and during the response.
When asked what actions were taken to protect DOT personnel from exposure to
chemical/biological agents, 13 out of the 17 (76%) DOTs responding to the AASHTO
Security Forum Survey mentioned at least one of two activities: (1) awareness
training in chemical/biological agents and (2) the implementation of personal
protective equipment for DOT personnel.

5.1.6 Compliance with Federal and State Requirements
When developing an EOP, INDOT should pay particular attention to complying
with all legal requirements of the Federal and State government, in particular those
included in the NIMS and the CEMP.
Initial NIMS compliance requires that all INDOT personnel who may be assigned
to the ICS established at the scene have basic knowledge of ICS principles. This
initial requirement is fulfilled by taking the IS-700 National Incident Management
System course, available on FEMA’s website. However, according to SEMA’s
Preparedness Director, future requirements may involve compliance with other NIMS
components, like interoperability of communications and resource typing, as
explained in Section 2.2. At the time this document was written, SEMA was preparing
a statewide NIMS Implementation Plan that will outline the process the state will use
to implement NIMS in Indiana emergency management. This plan will propose a
single point of contact between each state agency and SEMA, as a way for SEMA to
provide technical assistance and guidance in ensuring compliance with NIMS
requirements.
The CEMP has additional requirements. According to the state plan, all state
agencies and departments included in the CEMP must have Standard Operating
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Procedures in place to be used during emergencies. At a minimum, these SOPs
should include procedures for (1) the designation of lines of succession and
delegating authority, (2) the preservation of records, (3) the relocation of essential
departments, and (4) the deployment of essential personnel, equipment, and
supplies (SEMA, 2003).
The CEMP also requires agencies to designate a State Agency Emergency
Management Coordinator (and two backups), who will act as the coordination point
of the agency during emergencies (i.e., in the State EOC). In the case of INDOT,
those contacts have been already designated. However, it is important for INDOT to
further strengthen its relation with SEMA and other state agencies involved, so that
interaction with external parties does not occur solely during emergency exercises,
or worse, only during the actual emergency. In addition, information on emergency
management and transportation security is constantly emerging and Federal and
state procedures and requirements are constantly evolving. INDOT must be aware of
such information to ensure compliance with legal requirements and proper
emergency preparedness levels.
The research team suggests that INDOT designate a permanent position within
its central organization, with the responsibility of handling all emergency
management activities. This position can be responsible for doing a continuous
follow-up on all emergency management information, both at the national and state
levels. He/she will be in charge of monitoring information on new practices in
emergency management and transportation security. Having an emergency
management position at INDOT can also ensure and maintain a closer relation
between INDOT and SEMA, which will benefit both parties. In this way, INDOT can
enhance its emergency response capabilities and be continuously kept up to date on
the state of the practice of emergency management in Indiana. This INDOT position
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can also be responsible for performing periodic exercises and training sessions, and
can be delegated with the task of developing, maintaining, and updating the INDOT
EOP as appropriate.

5.2 Application of NIMS-ICS for INDOT in Emergency Response
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the NIMS designated the ICS as the standard
operational system to be used by all emergency agencies in the US. Section 4.1
presented an overview of the ICS, its basic principles and operational standards as
established by the NIMS. Based on what we have observed during the development
of this project, the research team has identified the ICS and its principles as
important organizational elements that can be adopted by INDOT to organize and
coordinate emergency response activities within the different levels of its
organization.
Although intended for emergency response agencies, Section 4.1.9 showed how
ICS has been adapted and implemented by many State DOTs across the US
(AASHTO, 2002a). In addition, the NIMS now requires all agencies involved in
emergency management to adopt the ICS as their basic system for emergency
response to be eligible for Federal preparedness grants (DHS, 2004b; FEMA, 2004).
According to SEMA, this condition will only affect INDOT initially in that basic training
on ICS will be required for all INDOT personnel that may be involved in emergency
response. However, based on INDOT’s current capabilities, highlighted during the
November mock drill, the research team recommends that INDOT coordinate its
internal activities by adopting an ICS-type organization for emergency response.
This section proposes a version of such a system that follows the NIMS principles,
which can be adopted by INDOT Districts and INDOT Central Office. The proposed
structures will not only enhance the management of activities within each of the
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organizations, but will also enable the INDOT Districts and Central Office to
coordinate their activities during emergencies and integrate effectively with the
statewide response. Furthermore, an ICS-type structure can be applied in response
to any type of emergency, that is, it will follow the all-hazards approach
recommended by emergency management experts. The organizational structure will
expand and contract, depending on the type of incident and how it evolves. The
required ICS training dictated by the NIMS will further enhance INDOT’s capabilities
and reaffirm the ICS basic principles applied in the ICS-type systems proposed.

5.2.1 ICS-type structure for INDOT Districts
Section 3.4 presented some of the issues observed in the current emergency
response capabilities of INDOT Districts. These issues included the existence of
unclear lines of authority and communication within the district organizations. As
presented in Section 4.1, the ICS has been proven to be an effective tool to organize
emergency response activities. Basic ICS principles presented in Table 4.1, such as
the modular organization, the concept of unity of command, and the unified
command structure under which ICS builds, can be valuable in addressing these
issues. With this in mind, an ICS-type structure like the one shown in Figure 5.1 is
proposed for adoption by INDOT districts. The positions shown in parentheses in
Figure 5.1 are examples of how each spot within the structure can be filled with
positions within the District∗.

∗

At the time this document was written, INDOT was undergoing major organizational restructuring at all
levels. The research team was advised by INDOT not to designate specific positions for the District ICS
structure because these were expected to change in the near future. Positions shown in Figure 5.1 are
examples based on the Seymour District Emergency Plan (INDOT, 2004).
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DISTRICT
INCIDENT COMMANDER
(District Director)

OPERATIONS
SECTION
(Operations Engineer)

PLANNING
SECTION
(Safety Coordinator)

LOGISTICS SECTION
(Equipment Operations
Engineer)

FINANCE/ADMIN.
SECTION
(Administrative Manager)

BRANCHES

DIVISIONS/GROUPS
(Subdistricts)

RESOURCES

FIGURE 5.1 – Proposed ICS-type structure for INDOT
District EOC∗

----------------------------------------

∗
At the time this document was written, INDOT was undergoing major organizational restructuring at all levels. The research team was advised not to
designate specific positions for the District ICS structure because these were expected to change in the near future. Positions shown in Figure 5.1 are
examples based on the Seymour District Emergency Plan (INDOT, 2004).
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Once an emergency has been declared, each INDOT District will activate a
District EOC that will operate following the District ICS structure explained in this
section, and will expand or contract to adapt to the specific requirements of the
incident. This organizational structure should be activated and maintained
throughout the response effort until the emergency is over. The specific procedures
that need to be followed for the activation and deactivation of the District ICS should
be included in the SOPs, as explained in Section 5.3.
The ICS-type structure for each district will start with the District Incident
Commander (DIC). Following ICS principles, the DIC is the person in charge of all
aspects of the response within the district. He/she is the person responsible for the
overall response activities undertaken by the district. The DIC’s responsibilities can
include those shown in Table 5.1.

TABLE 5.1 – District Incident Commander Responsibilities
District Incident Commander Responsibilities
• Establish and monitor district incident organization.
• Maintain continuous contact with INDOT EOC representatives and Central Office
as appropriate, for coordination of activities.
• Establish immediate priorities especially the safety of responders DOT personnel
• Determine incident objectives and strategy to achieve the objectives.
• Coordinate activities for all staff under the incident organization.
• Coordinate with key people and officials.
• Approve requests for additional resources or for the release of resources.
• Order the deactivation of the incident when appropriate.

The standard ICS includes the possibility for the Incident Commander to activate
a series of support positions under the Command Staff (i.e., the Information Officer,
the Liasion Officer, and the Safety Officer). This is usually the case for large scale

incidents or incidents that require special considerations in a specific area (e.g., an
incident that represents a high risk for personnel may require a Safety Officer) (DHS,
2004b; FEMA, 1998; OSHA, 2004). For the specific case of the INDOT Districts,
however, the District ICS organization proposed is relatively simple and will consist
of few positions. In this way, the DIC can be expected to perform these tasks
appropriately and considering extra positions under the Command Staff may not be
required.
An Operations Section is activated by the DIC for incidents that require specific
involvement of INDOT resources, including personnel. In the same way as with
standard ICS, a District Operations Section Chief is assigned to this section. This
Chief’s main responsibility is the supervision of all operations undertaken by
personnel from the INDOT District. This includes determining the need and request
for additional resources to perform all operational activities under the district’s
responsibility.
Depending on the incident and the type and number of activities that the district
is required to perform, the resources assigned to the Operations Section of the
district can be further broken down into Divisions or Groups. The decision to use
Divisions or Groups depends on the incident at hand. For example, the use of
Divisions can be convenient in incidents that require several INDOT Subdistricts
involved in the operations. In this case, resources assigned by each Subdistrict can
be organized by activating a Division for each of the Subdistricts involved. This is
particularly useful when resources want to be tracked by Subdistrict. In addition, it
allows for a better understanding of the chain of command, because the current nonemergency structure of each district can be maintained in emergencies. On the other
hand, for incidents that require several activities to be performed by a specific
INDOT District, it may be more appropriate to organize resources by the function
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they perform. For example, all resources assigned for debris removal can be
assigned under the Debris Removal Group under the Operations Section. In either
case, the procedures required to expand and contract the Operations Section should
be included in the SOPs.
A Planning Section is also considered in the District ICS proposed as shown in
Figure 5.1. As with any ICS section, a Planning Section Chief is assigned as the
overall planning authority. The Planning Section Chief is responsible for all planning
necessary for the correct performance of the activities assigned to the District. For
the case of a District ICS, not all the tasks assigned to the Planning Section and the
respective Planning Units mentioned in section 4.1 are applicable. Only the tasks of
the Resources Unit, the Situation Unit, and the Documentation Unit may be required
(refer to Table 4.4). However, assigning individual units under the Planning Section
as proposed by standard ICS may not be necessary in most cases. It is expected that
for most incidents the Planning Section Chief is capable of performing all these tasks.
If the characteristics of the incident require extensive planning efforts, one or more
of these units can be activated.
Table 5.2 shows the responsibilities assigned to the Planning Section of the
District ICS. Among these tasks, one of the most important consists of maintaining
the status and tracking of all district resources assigned to the response effort. This
way, the District is able to locate and establish the specific tasks its resources are
performing. Another important task is the elaboration of the Incident Action Plan
(IAP). (Refer to Section 4.1.5.) For the specific case of a District ICS, one may
expect the IAP to be commonly established orally rather than written. Having a
written plan is more convenient in large scale incidents where a significant number of
personnel are assigned to the ICS. In the case of a District ICS, establishing an oral
IAP may be sufficient. In any case, the DIC and the Planning Section Chief have to
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make sure the incident objectives are clear among all the participants within the
District ICS.

TABLE 5.2 – District ICS Planning Section Responsibilities
District ICS Planning Section Responsibilities
• Collect and process situation information about the incident.
• Keep track of the current location and status of all assigned resources from the district.
• Collect, process, and organize ongoing situation information.
• Develop projections and forecasts of future events.
• Prepare maps.
• Gather and disseminate information and intelligence for use in the IAP.
• Maintain accurate and complete incident files, including a complete record of major steps
taken to resolve the incident.
• File, maintain, and store incident files for legal, analytical, and historical purposes.
• Prepare the IAP.

A Logistics Section can also be activated as a part of the District ICS structure as
shown in Figure 5.1. Although the ICS considers six possible units that can be
activated within the Logistics Section, for the case of the activities INDOT Districts
may be required to perform, only those of the Supply Unit are expected to be
necessary. Thus, the Logistics Section of the District ICS structure will be
responsible, if necessary, for acquiring and managing all resources required, in
addition to those within the District, to support their emergency response activities.
For example, if the resources available within a District are not sufficient to perform
the response activities appropriately, the District may have to request additional
resources from other Districts. The Logistics Section of each District will be
responsible of the request and management of these external resources.
A Finance/Administration section is proposed to be implemented within the
District ICS structure as shown in Figure 6.1. This section will mainly be responsible
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for performing the duties assigned to the Cost Unit as stated in the ICS. These
include the estimation, recording, and analysis of all costs incurred by the District
during the different stages of the response efforts.

5.2.2 Lines of Communication/Coordination
Figures 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 show the lines of communication/coordination
expected for four different response scenarios, each one representing a different
level of involvement of the INDOT districts in the response activities. The four cases
considered are:
Case 1. Single incident handled by one INDOT District (Figure 5.2)
Case 2. Single incident handled by two INDOT Districts (Figure 5.3)
Case 3. Two separate incidents handled by two INDOT Districts (Figure 5.4)
Case 4. Single incident handled by one INDOT District with support provided by a
second INDOT District (Figure 5.5).

These figures show how the coordination of activities of the districts is
accomplished directly through the INDOT representatives located at the State EOC,
with INDOT Central Office providing any support required. Note that no lines of
communication are shown directly linking the different districts. This allows the
INDOT representatives at the State EOC to coordinate activities effectively. Direct
communication between the districts (as often happens in real emergency
operations), may be acceptable if up-to-date information on the actual status of
operations is made available to the representatives at the State EOC.
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INCIDENT

SEMA MOBILE
COMMAND
CENTER

INDOT DISTRICT
EOC A (ICS A)

OTHER
INFORMATION

STATE
EOC

SUPPORT

INDOT CENTRAL OFFICE

= INDOT representatives

FIGURE 5.2 – Case 1. Lines of communication/coordination for an incident
handled by INDOT District A

INCIDENT

SEMA MOBILE
COMMAND
CENTER

INDOT DISTRICT
EOC A (ICS A)

OTHER
INFORMATION
INDOT DISTRICT
EOC B (ICS B)

STATE
EOC

SUPPORT

INDOT CENTRAL OFFICE

= INDOT representatives

FIGURE 5.3 – Case 2. Lines of communication/coordination for an incident
handled by INDOT District A and INDOT District B
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INCIDENT A

SEMA MOBILE
COMMAND
CENTER

INDOT DISTRICT
EOC A (ICS A)

OTHER
INFORMATION

INCIDENT B
INDOT DISTRICT
EOC B (ICS B)

STATE
EOC

SUPPORT

INDOT CENTRAL OFFICE

= INDOT representatives

FIGURE 5.4 – Case 3. Lines of communication/coordination for two separate
incidents handled by INDOT Districts A and B

INCIDENT

INDOT DISTRICT
EOC A (ICS A)

SEMA MOBILE
COMMAND
CENTER

RESOURCES

OTHER
INFORMATION
INDOT DISTRICT
EOC B (ICS B)

STATE
EOC

SUPPORT

INDOT CENTRAL OFFICE

= INDOT representatives

FIGURE 5.5 – Case 4. Lines of communication/coordination for an incident
handled by INDOT District B with additional resources from INDOT District A
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5.2.3 Area Command-type structure for INDOT Central Office
The channels of communication/coordination presented in Section 5.2.2 are
appropriate for incidents in which INDOT’s level of involvement is not significant
enough to overwhelm the capacity of the INDOT representatives at the State EOC.
However, large-scale incidents (e.g., terrorist attacks) may demand extensive
participation by INDOT, with the possibility of considerable amounts of INDOT
resources being deployed. In addition, the possibility of simultaneous incidents
occurring in different geographical locations may require the participation of several
INDOT districts, for which proper coordination of activities is required. For large-scale
emergencies, the capacity of the INDOT representatives at the State EOC to
coordinate all aspects of the response directly with the districts may not be
adequate.
For large-scale incidents, the research team suggests that INDOT Central Office
act as the coordination point of all internal activities, as shown in Figure 5.6. This
follows the concept of Coordination Entities used in the NRP as explained in Section
2.3. Once an emergency in which the capacity of the INDOT representatives at the
State EOC is expected to be overwhelmed, an INDOT Central Office EOC can be
activated to coordinate INDOT’s overall activities. This coordination can be organized
by adopting and following the concept of Area Command used by emergency
management agencies and included in the NIMS, as explained in Section 4.1.8.
Adopting such a structure allows INDOT’s Central Office EOC to manage overall
emergency response in INDOT’s districts, by coordinating the response that each
District ICS will provide. The specific procedures to activate the Central Office EOC
should be included in the SOPs.
A possible Area Command-based structure that can be implemented in INDOT’s
Central Office EOC is shown in Figure 5.7. The positions shown in parentheses are
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examples of how each spot within the structure can be filled by positions within the
Central Office∗.

INTERNAL

EXTERNAL

STATE EOC

INDOT
CENTRAL
OFFICE

INDOT
DISTRICTS

FIGURE 5.6 – INDOT Central Office as Internal Coordination Point

INDOT CENTRAL OFFICE
AREA COMMANDER
(Operations Support Chief)

PLANNING
SECTION
(Highway Support
Manager)

LOGISTICS
SECTION
(Highway Support
Field Engineer)

SUPPORT
POSITIONS

Critical Resources Unit Leader
Situation Unit Leader
Public Information Officer

Figure 5.7 –INDOT Central Office EOC∗

∗
At the time this document was written, INDOT was undergoing major organizational restructuring at all
levels. The research team was advised not to designate specific positions for the Central Office EOC
because these were expected to change in the near future. Positions shown in Figure 5.7 are merely
examples based on our observations and judgment.
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Table 5.3 shows the general responsibilities assigned to each of the elements
included in the INDOT Central Office EOC. As mentioned in Section 4.1.8, the Critical
Resources Unit Leader, the Situation Unit Leader, and the Public Information Officer
positions are only activated when considered necessary. If the incident does not
require these positions to be activated, the tasks assigned to the Critical Resources
Unit Leader and the Situation Unit Leader can be adopted by the Logistics Section
and the Planning Section, respectively.

Table 5.3 - INDOT Central Office EOC Responsibilities
Position

Responsibilities

Central Office Area Commander

• Overall management and supervision of District EOCs
(ICSs)
• Ensure possible conflicts are identified and resolved.
• Set overall INDOT objectives.
• Select strategies for the allocation and use of INDOT
resources.

Planning Section

• Collection of information from District EOCs
• Assess and evaluate potential conflicts.

Logistics Section

• Effective allocation of INDOT resources among District
EOCs.

Critical Resources Unit Leader
(if necessary)
Situation Unit Leader

• Track and maintain status and availability of INDOT
resources assigned by each District EOC.
• Monitor status of objectives of each District EOC.

(if necessary)
Public Information Officer

• Point of contact for the media.

(if necessary)
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5.2.4 Lines of Communication/Coordination with INDOT Central Office EOC Activated
When the INDOT Central Office EOC is activated, the lines of communication
presented in Section 5.2.2 are modified to include this coordination point. Figures
5.8, 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 show how these lines of communication/coordination are
modified for each of the four cases presented in Section 5.2.2. The top part of each
of these figures shows the lines of communication before the Central Office EOC is
activated. The bottom portion shows how these lines are modified once the Central
Office EOC is activated.
For Case 1, notice how the activities performed by District A are now coordinated
with the State EOC through the INDOT Central Office EOC. The activation of the
Central Office EOC may not be generally necessary in emergencies with this type of
response, where there is only one district involved. In these cases, coordinating
activities directly from the State EOC may be sufficient. However, large-scale
emergencies in which the Central Office needs to be involved in the coordination and
supervision of activities may require an active Central Office EOC.
Figures 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11 show how all coordination of activities of the districts
involved, including the assignment of resources from other districts, is coordinated
directly by the Central Office EOC once it is activated. This ensures that the
integrated effort of Districts A and B follow the overall objectives defined by INDOT
for the emergency, and that these efforts are coordinated with the overall statewide
effort in the EOC.
In conclusion, a series of principles underlie the overall coordination of activities,
both internally and externally, once the Central Office EOC is activated:
•

Information to/from the State EOC goes through the INDOT Central Office
EOC.
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•

Information to/from the INDOT Districts goes through the Central Office
EOC and, as necessary, is relayed to the State EOC.

•

Coordination (e.g., for allocating resources) required between INDOT
Districts is to be coordinated through INDOT Central Office EOC following
the principles of AC.

•

INDOT Central Office EOC will act as the coordination point for all INDOT
emergency response activities. It will define priorities and will ensure that
no conflicts arise between the activities of the Districts and the statewide
response efforts.
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FIGURE 5.8 – Case 1. Modification of lines of communication/coordination
for an incident handled by INDOT District A with INDOT Central Office EOC
activated
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FIGURE 5.9 – Case 2. Modification of lines of communication/coordination
for an incident handled by INDOT District A and INDOT District B with
activated INDOT Central Office EOC
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FIGURE 5.10 – Case 3. Modification of lines of communication/coordination
for two separate incidents handled by INDOT Districts A and B with INDOT
Central Office EOC activated
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FIGURE 5.11 – Case 4. Lines of communication/coordination for an incident
handled by INDOT District B with additional resources from INDOT District A
with INDOT Central Office EOC activated
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5.3. INDOT EOP Structure
The basic principles and organizational elements presented in Sections 5.1 and
5.2 constitute the basis for the development of an INDOT EOP. The EOP is a written
document that includes all the procedures INDOT personnel at all levels need to
follow when responding to an emergency. Consequently, an INDOT EOP needs to be
carefully developed in a way that allows personnel to have all the required
information and still be simple enough to quickly absorb its contents.
As a way to guide state and local emergency management agencies in developing
EOPs, FEMA released the Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Planning (FEMA, 1996).
According to this document, there is no definitive format to use when developing an
EOP, as long as the final users of the plan can understand it, are comfortable with it,
and can use it to extract the information they need. However, most DOT EOPs try to
mirror the basic structure used by state emergency management plans in the US
(AASHTO, 2002a). These structures usually consist of a general section or Basic Plan
that defines all general planning considerations and procedures involved in the DOT
emergency response, and a series of sections and annexes that describe
responsibilities and operational tasks at a greater level of detail (AASHTO, 2002a;
FEMA, 1996). The research team suggests that INDOT use a similar structure to
develop their internal EOP. This section presents a general overview of the structural
elements that can be considered to develop an INDOT EOP, as an aid to INDOT
personnel when developing the actual plan. The elements proposed are based on
FEMA’s guidelines in Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Planning (FEMA, 1996) and
AASHTO’s recommendations in A Guide to Updating Highway Emergency Response
Plans (AASHTO, 2002a).
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5.3.1 Basic Plan
The Basic Plan is an overview of INDOT’s emergency response organization and
the policies that govern all response activities. Table 5.4 shows the basic elements
and a description of the contents that may be included in an INDOT EOP.

Table 5.4 – Elements included in INDOT EOP Basic Plan
BASIC PLAN

CONTENTS

Purpose

- State objective of plan

Planning Assumptions

- Planning considerations
- All-hazard approach
- Integration with statewide efforts
- NIMS, NRP, and CEMP are effective.
- INDOT facilities are operational.

Organization

- Organization based on NIMS-ICS
- Organizational elements included (i.e., State EOC, Central
Office, Central Office EOC, and District EOCs)
- Lines of authority.

Roles and Responsibilities

- INDOT general responsibilities during response (i.e., support to
CEMP)
- Roles and responsibilities of each element of response structure
(i.e., State EOC, Central Office, Central Office EOC, and District
EOCs) and each of the elements within the ICS, with backups.

Concept of Operations

- Activation procedures of INDOT EOP
- Lines of communication/coordination
- Notification procedures
- Communications Plan

5.3.2 Continuity of Operations Plan
In order to ensure redundancy in INDOT’s operations, a Continuity of Operations
(COOP) Plan is recommended to be included as a section within the INDOT EOP. As
explained in Section 5.1.4, the COOP plan will address all necessary precautions and
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internal measures that need to be implemented after a disruption in INDOT’s normal
operations. The COOP plan should address contingencies to be able to perform all
essential emergency tasks in case of (1) inability to use facilities, (2) loss of power,
(3) loss of communications, (4) unavailable personnel, or (5) inaccessible
information technology systems (TRB, 2005). TCRP project J-10F to be released soon
will guide transportation agencies in developing and including COOP plans into their
EOPs. The TCRP project can help INDOT incorporate a COOP into the development of
its EOP.

5.3.3 Standard Operating Procedures
As a way to standardize response capabilities at the different levels of INDOT’s
organization, an INDOT EOP should include a set of SOPs that will guide its personnel
in performing all emergency response activities. In this way, INDOT personnel will
know exactly what specific steps to follow for a given emergency response task.
According to FEMA (1996), SOPs should be designed in a way that enables personnel
to quickly extract the information required. A common practice is to include them in
the EOP as separate sections for quick reference, and present them in a checklist
format for personnel to follow. SOPs can be supplemented with maps and other
reference material. Table 5.5 presents some of the SOPs that may be included in an
INDOT EOP.
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Table 5.5 – Standard Operating Procedures for INDOT EOP
Standard Operating Procedures

Description

Notification procedures

Notification procedures (including call lists) for Central
Office, Districts, TMC, State EOC, and external agencies
like ISP and SEMA.

Resource management

Procedures for allocation and tracking of INDOT
resources.

Activation of response elements

Activation and deactivation procedures of State EOC
INDOT representatives, Central Office EOC, and Districts
EOC.

Road Closure

Considerations and measures for closing roads, including
notification procedures to ISP.

Evacuation

Evacuation routes

Traffic Management

Procedures for traffic control during emergencies (e.g.,
timing plans for evacuation and/or emergency response
routes)

Inspection of transportation

Structural assessment of bridges, overpasses, and

infrastructure

highway intersections.

TMC emergency operations

DMS contents for different types of emergencies.
Integration with State EOC (notification procedures).

5.3.4 Hazard-specific Plans
Hazard-specific sections of an EOP address any issues peculiar to certain types of
emergencies, but that are not applicable to the rest of the EOP. In order to create
hazard-specific plans, INDOT must consider the different types of incidents that may
pose threats to Indiana’s transportation system, and the countermeasures that need
to be put in place for these events. According to AASHTO (AASHTO, 2002a), typical
DOT EOPs include hazard-specific annexes for emergencies such as earthquakes,
radiological incidents, HAZMAT incidents, hurricanes, snow/ice, mass gathering, and
terrorism.
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5.3.5 Protective Measures for Different Levels of HSAS
A section that defines internal protective measures following the HSAS should be
developed within the INDOT EOP. This section will address specific actions that need
to be implemented at the different levels of INDOT according to the threat level on
the nation’s advisory system.
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CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The events of 9/11 highlighted the need for transportation agencies to review,
revise, and update their existing emergency response procedures to include
appropriate provisions within the new terrorist threat imposed on the nation. Since
then, significant effort has been placed by public and private organizations in
developing information that will guide State DOTs in enhancing their emergency
response procedures. In addition, Federal measures have been put into place as a
way to enhance emergency management at the national level. These efforts’ main
focus is on standardizing emergency management procedures among the different
actors involved, whether these are Federal, state, local, or private organizations.
In the specific case of INDOT, special attention needs to be placed on updating its
current emergency response practices to ensure these are integrated and up-to-date
with the practices in place by emergency agencies at all levels. This includes the
need for INDOT to develop an Emergency Operations Plan that establishes all
provisions required and the procedures INDOT personnel at all levels need to follow
when responding to an emergency. This INDOT EOP should describe who will do
what, as well as when, with what resources, and by what authority, before, during,
and immediately after an emergency (FEMA, 1996). The INDOT EOP should follow
certain principles and considerations to ensure it is integrated with emergency
management practices of other disciplines. The procedures included should consider
following an all-hazards approach, ensure proper integration and interoperability,
and redundancy and Continuity of Operations. It should also have provisions to
ensure INDOT personnel safety both prior and during the response efforts. In
addition, all procedures included in an INDOT EOP should comply with Federal and
State emergency management requirements like those outlined in the National
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Incident Management System and the Indiana Comprehensive Emergency
Management Plan, respectively.
INDOT should also consider adopting the Incident Command System as its
organizational structure for emergency response operations. After the NIMS was
released by the DHS, state and local agencies were required to adopt the ICS to be
eligible for Federal preparedness grants. To fulfill this requirement, all agency
personnel that may be required to work in the ICS established at the incident needs
to be trained in ICS basics. This is accomplished by taking the IS-700 National
Incident Management System course, available on FEMA’s website. However,
adapting the ICS as presented in Section 5.2 would allow INDOT to have a flexible
organizational structure that can adapt to the specific requirements of any
emergency. INDOT will also be able to build upon a system that has been used since
the 1970s by emergency response agencies and is now considered to be the
standard system for incident management (DHS, 2004b).
The guidelines presented in this document are intended to be merely
recommendations for consideration by INDOT in their future security initiatives.
Although interaction between INDOT and the research team was maintained during
this project, the adoption of any of the actions described in this document will
require further discussion and refinement by INDOT.
As presented in Chapter 4, ITS can be a very valuable resource for emergency
response, not only for INDOT itself, but for other emergency agencies. Valuable
information can be obtained from ITS technologies deployed in Indiana’s highway
systems. Further research may be required to identify any specific requirements
INDOT’s current ITS capabilities may need to fully exploit their potential for support
to emergency response. A possible practice may be to strengthen the relationship
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between the INDOT TMCs and the State EOC, and even physically integrating their
facilities.
Another area of future research is that of Decision Support Systems (DSS) as
support for INDOT emergency response. Section 4.4 presented some examples of
existing applications and outlined some of the benefits of using such systems.
Possible applications of DSS in INDOT may include the design of a DSS that can
guide personnel step by step through the specific procedures that need to be
followed for different response scenarios. The set of Standard Operating Procedures
outlined in Table 5.5 can be included in such DSS. INDOT personnel can then make
appropriate decisions based on the output obtained from the DSS.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – TASKS ASSIGNED TO INDOT BY THE CEMP

The following is a list of INDOT’s emergency response responsibilities in
statewide emergency management according to the Indiana Comprehensive
Emergency Management Plan (CEMP). The list follows the CEMP structure of six
sections:
1. Basic Plan
2. Operations Section
3. Emergency Services Section
4. Human Services Section
5. Infrastructure Support Section
6. Hazards Specific Section

1. BASIC PLAN SECTION
The Basic Plan Section is divided into three elements: Financial Management
element, General Tasks element, and Public Information Emergency Support
Function.

1.1

Financial Management Element
This element provides financial management guidelines to SEMA and other state

agencies to ensure funds are provided and financial operations are conducted in
accordance with state policies and procedures during the response and recovery
phases of an emergency.
According to the CEMP, all state agencies with emergency functions (including
INDOT) should:
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a. Provide its own financial services and support to its response operations in
the field. Funds to cover eligible costs for response activities will be provided
through reimbursement by SEMA.
b. State agencies may be required to spend more than their allocated budget to
effectively respond to an emergency. After state agencies begin their initial
response operations, it may be necessary to prepare and submit a report on
the estimated funding needs for the duration of the emergency response. The
purpose of the estimate is to help establish the need for an additional
allocation from the Governor’s Contingency Fund or supplemental or special
legislative appropriations.
c. Maintain records, receipts and documents to support claims, purchases,
reimbursements and disbursements. Reimbursement requests will be
documented with specific details on personnel services, travel and other
expenses.

1.2

General Tasks Element
This element consists of those tasks common to all agencies and Emergency

Support Functions.
For Response, INDOT’s general tasks include:
a. Identify potential funding resources that are available for mitigation
(mitigation).
b. Identify requirements for hazard specific resources and equipment
(mitigation).
c. Identify Emergency Support Function specific training requirements
(mitigation).
d. Identify Emergency Support Function weaknesses for exercise (mitigation).
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e. Develop and maintain Standard Operating Procedures/Guidelines and other
plans and procedures necessary (preparedness).
f.

Develop and maintain resource and equipment lists (preparedness).

g. Develop and maintain contact lists with essential information (address,
telephone, cell, and facsimile numbers, email) included (preparedness).
h. Develop or participate in two exercises per year (preparedness).
i.

Assess scope, magnitude, and extent of incident. Determine extent of hazard
remaining (response).

j.

Activate Emergency Support Function and its personnel, based on incident
assessment (response).

k. Obtain status report on State activities, upon reporting to Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) (response).
l.

Assist in the development of the Incident Action Plan (IAP) (response).

m. Maintain record of actions taken (response).
n. Request Federal assistance/resources as needed (response).
o. Prepare appropriate After Action Reports (recovery)

1.3

Public Information Emergency Support Function
No tasks are assigned for INDOT in this section.

2. OPERATIONS SECTION
Consists of three Emergency Support Functions: communications/warning,
information and planning, and resource support.

2.1

Communications and Warning Emergency Support Function
Lead agency is SEMA. No tasks assigned for INDOT.
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2.2

Information and Planning Emergency Support Function
Lead agency is SEMA, with all agencies serving as support agencies.
INDOT’s tasks for Information and Planning include:
a. Collect/gather, verify, analyze, and disseminate incident information, as
needed (response).
b. Notify appropriate State agencies, keeping them up-to-date on the situation
(response).
c. Provide situation reports of Emergency Support Function activities to EOC
supervisor as required (response).
d. Collect information for periodic situation updates (response).

2.3

Resource Support Emergency Support Function
Lead agency is SEMA, with all agencies serving as support agencies as needed.

Resource Support provides support requirements not specifically identified in the
other Emergency Support Functions.
INDOT’s role in Resource Support is merely recovery oriented and includes:
a. Account for all equipment used during incident (recovery).
b. Provide resource status and accountability updates as required (recovery).
c. Compile accurate accounting for all resources acquired (recovery).

3. EMERGENCY SERVICES SECTION
The Emergency services section consists of five Emergency Support Functions:
Firefighting, Health and Medical, Search and Rescue, Hazardous Materials, and Law
Enforcement.
There are no INDOT-specific tasks assigned in this section.
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4. HUMAN SUPPORT SECTION
The purpose of this section is to directly support those agencies giving aid to
victims of disasters and emergencies. It consists of four Emergency Support
Functions: Shelter/Mass care, Food/Water, Animal Health and Care, and
Donations/Volunteer Management.

4.1

Shelter/Mass Care Emergency Support Function
No tasks assigned for INDOT.

4.2

Food/Water Emergency Support Function
Two tasks are assigned for INDOT in this Emergency Support Function:
a. Coordinate with Transportation Emergency Support Function the identification
and location of transportation assets necessary for the transport of
food/water/ice (mitigation).
b. Coordinate with Transportation Emergency Support Function to implement
procedures for the transportation of food/water/ice and other supplies to
shelters and feeding sites/facilities (response)

4.3

Animal Health and Care Emergency Support Function
No tasks assigned for INDOT.

4.4

Donations/Volunteer Management
No tasks assigned for INDOT.
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5. INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT SECTION
Consists of four Emergency Support Functions: Transportation, Public Works and
Engineering, Energy, and Damage Assessment.

5.1

Transportation Emergency Support Function
INDOT serves as the primary coordinating agency. The main objective of the

Transportation Emergency Support Function is to assist local governments and
voluntary organizations requiring transportation capacity to perform response
missions following a major disaster or emergency. It serves as a coordination point
between response operations and restoration of the transportation infrastructure.
INDOT’s tasks in the Transportation Emergency Support Function include:
a. Maintain and update personnel and equipment certifications (preparedness).
b. Coordinate with Law Enforcement Emergency Support Function and Public
Works Emergency Support Function, to provide assistance in placing
barricades, controlling traffic, etc., as needed (response).
c. Coordinate with Federal and State agencies, to determine hours of service
and issue regulation waiver for commercial vehicles delivery of critical energy
products (response).

5.2

Public Works and Engineering
Lead agency is the Department of Administration, with INDOT acting as one of

the support agencies.
INDOT’s tasks include:
a. Inspect bridges throughout the State on an annual basis (mitigation).
b. Maintain small portable generators (preparedness).
c. Provide traffic control resources to Law Enforcement, as needed (response).
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d. Coordinate with Law Enforcement Emergency Support Function, on the
decision to close roads (response).
e. Provide engineering expertise, equipment, contractors and contract
equipment, traffic control, and barricades, as needed (response).
f.

Secure dump trucks for use in an emergency, as needed (response).

g. Assist in clearing roads and bridges in an emergency and as requested
(response).
h. Provide chainsaw crews and loader/dump truck crews for debris removal and
road clearing (response).
i.

Inspect public bridges, overpasses, and railroad/highway intersections for
structural integrity after a disaster (recovery).

5.3

Energy Emergency Support Function
No tasks assigned for INDOT.

5.4

Damage Assessment Emergency Support Function
Lead agency is SEMA Recovery Division, with INDOT acting as one of the support

agencies.
INDOT’s tasks in this Emergency Support Function are the same as for all
agencies included in the CEMP, and include:
a. Send assessment reports to SEMA (response).
b. Assist local authorities in performing damage assessments, as requested
(response).
c. Assist in the preparation of economic injury information of affected areas from
major disasters (recovery).

159

6. HAZARDS SPECIFIC SECTION
The purpose of the section is to contain specific information on emergency or
disaster situations not found in the other sections of the CEMP.

6.1

Terrorism Consequence Management Element.
This element addresses the specialized emergency response operations and

supporting efforts needed by Indiana in the event of a known, suspected, or
threatened terrorist incident occurring within its borders. It supplements the CEMP
by addressing those specialized considerations necessary in case of a terrorist attack.
The Terrorism Consequence Management Element is organized in the same
manner as the CEMP’s structure. For INDOT, there are no additional tasks assigned
in the case of terrorism additional to those already covered in the rest of the CEMP.
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APPENDIX B

Questions for AASHTO Forum on Transportation Security
For Indiana DOT

1. Which person (by job position), if any, has been designated to lead your state
DOT’s planning activities for transportation security?

2. To what extent has your DOT carried out a vulnerability assessment?
A. Complete, having considered all transportation-related assets in the state.
B. Preliminary, having focused on those assets deemed to be most
important.
C. Nothing formal yet.
D. Other (specify):

3. If a vulnerability assessment has been conducted, who did it?
A. DOT staff (please list job positions involved)
B. A multidisciplinary team (describe briefly)
C. A consultant (give company name)
D. Other (specify)

4. If a vulnerability assessment has been conducted, please describe briefly the
method that was used, and/or provide a person to contact for more information.
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5. Does your DOT have an internal Emergency Operations Plan, independent of the
usual all-hazards State Emergency Management Plans, with specific provisions for
emergency response to terrorist incidents?

6. Does your DOT have a special organizational structure (e.g., the Incident
Command System) for emergency response? If so, please describe or provide a
person to contact for more information.

7. What actions, if any, have been taken to protect DOT personnel responding to an
incident from exposure to chemical/biological agents?

8. Has your state DOT adopted any type of surveillance (such as sensors or
cameras) to monitor its assets? If so, what technology and what types of assets?

9. How are the DOT’s emergency response actions coordinated with other agencies
within the state?

10. Were there any modifications in your DOT’s internal (within the DOT) and
external (with other agencies) communications procedures to respond to terrorist
incidents? If so, what actions were taken?

11. Does your DOT (plan to) use any type of computer-based decision support
system as a tool for emergency response decision making?
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STATE DOT SURVEY AASHTO FORUM
Emergency Response
STATE DOT

EOP

ICS

ACTIONS TO PROTECT DOT
PERSONNEL

MODIFICATIONS IN COMMUNICATIONS
PROCEDURES
- Critical structure emergency action plans.

1

Arkansas

Yes

Yes - Awareness training in HAZMAT.

2

Colorado

No

No

3

Connecticut

Yes

N/A - Awareness training in HAZMAT.

4
5

Georgia
Kansas

Yes
No

Yes - None
No - None

- Notification procedures for reporting threats.
- Notification lists activated according to threat
level.
- None
- None
- Integration of DOT with ER agencies.
- Ability to conduct statewide communications
through State communication system.

- Personal Protective Equipment.
- Awareness training in HAZMAT.

6

Maryland

Yes

- Personal Protective Equipment.
Yes
- Awareness training

7

Missouri

Yes

Yes - None

8

Montana

Yes

Yes - Basic protective measures guide.

9

Nebraska

Yes

N/A - None

10

Nevada

Yes

Yes - Awareness training in HAZMAT.

11

New Mexico

Yes

Yes - Awareness training in HAZMAT.

12

New York

Yes

Yes - Several initiatives. Did not specify.

13

Oregon

Yes

14

Pennsylvania

Yes

- Personal Protective Equipment.
- Awareness training
Yes - Personal Protective Equipment.

15

Texas

Yes

No

16

Vermont

No

Yes - N/A

17

Wyoming

No

No

Yes

- Awareness training

- None

DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM

No

- None

No
N/A

-

No
Yes, in development by State EMA.
Yes.
WebEOC operated by State EMA.
Web-based GPS mapping application (EMMA)
to coordinate and assist decision making,
communications, and resource allocation.

- No modifications in procedures.
No
- Update radio system
- Emphasis in interagency communications and
interoperability.
No
- Lines of communications modified to adopt ICS.
- Calling system that manages calling groups and
- Yes. In development by various State
monitors internal communications through a
agencies.
central point (operator).
Yes
No
- Developed system for transmission of secure
No. Considered but not recommended.
information
- Several initiatives to update notification and
No
communication procedures.
Yes. Web-based system (Ops Center) through
- Notification procedures for reporting threats.
State EMA to track resources.
Yes
N/A
- Notification procedures for reporting threats.
No
- Equipped by the Texas DHS with a Nextel
phone to be attended 24/7/365.
No
- None
- Yes, communication system used by State
- None
EMA.
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STATE DOT SURVEY - HPMS

QUESTION

STATE DOT

Does your DOT use a version of the Incident Command System as your operational structure for responding to largescale terrorist events or natural disasters? If not, have you devised another special command and control structure for
such situations?

1

New Mexico

ANSWER
A State Highway Incident Management plan has just been developed. Training on it is expected to begin within the
next quarter.

2

Minnesota

Uses ICS, currently MIMS (Minnesota Incident Management System)

ICS
YES
YES

Will be transitioning to NIMS (National Incident Management System) as

3

Colorado

soon as it is available.
Yes. The State Division of Emergency Management is revising this system based on the National Response Plan
(NRP) and the NIMS. CDOT is participating in this process.

4

Utah

N/A

5

Puerto Rico

N/A

YES

6

Rhode Island

Do have an IC protocol that is followed within the Transportation Management

YES

YES

Center. Have distributed to multiple responders and are presently revising that
protocol through Incident Management Task Force.
7

Mississippi

Yes, ICS is being used by all MS State Agencies as directed by the governor.

YES

8

South Dakota

Not sure what ICS is, but they are part of the State Emergency Response Plan

NO

which delineate overall operational structure. Feel that thorugh their experience
with winter storms and floods, they have developed a structure to be able to
respond to most disasters
9

New Hampshire

Uses ICS, in conjunction with other emergency reponse agencies. Have not

YES

developed or trained DOT personnel on this.
Currently act as support agency at scene.
This will come into more use as part of a four (4) Department MOU on Traffic
Incident Management.
10

Delaware

Yes. They will be incorporating the NIMS in the future.

YES

11

Pennsylvania

Uses a version of ICS for responding to natural hazards.

YES

12

Connecticut

Currently use the ICS and are migrating towards the NIMS within the mandated framework.

YES

13

Iowa

ICS used by all departmental first responders in their fields operations. Also used by the

YES

departmental motor vehicle enforcement officers in their field operations. Its use is required by the Code of Iowa.
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STATE DOT SURVEY AASHTO FORUM
Vulnerability Assessment
State

TP Security lead

Who conducted VA

Extent of VA

Methodology Used

Arkansas

Highway police chief

Preliminary-bridges and
tunnels

Colorado

Operations and Maintenatce Manager

Preliminary

Field, bridge and maintenance staff

Connecticut

Manager of Highway operations

Preliminary

Multidiciplinary team

AASHTO
Bridges and interchanges based on
cost , replacement time and usage

Georgia

Director of operations

Complete

DOT staff, GEMA,Georgia HS, Bureau of
investigation and Secret Service

N/A

Kansas

Staff engineer

VA as a part of study by
Adjutant General’s Office

Adjutant General's office

N/A

Preliminary-just
headquarters

Systech Group In

AASHTO

Maryland

DOT Staff, brige, maintenance and district
engineer

assessing the vulnerabilityby
evaluating the engineering integrity of

Montana

HS Coordinator
Disaster and Financial Management
Bureau

Informal

Nebraska

Operations and maintenance manager

Preliminary

Informal process used for bridges
Dot Staff, Field, operations and maintenance Bridges based on cost, redundancy
personnel
and exposure

Nevada

Chief Maintenance Engineer

Preliminary

Chief Maintenance Engineer

Individual target VA worksheets

New Mexico

Deputy Secretary

Preliminary

SAIC/Parsons Brinkerhoff and NMDOT

Developed by SIAC

New York

Chief of Staff

Complete

Chief engineer and his staff

Principles of risk management

Statewide Emergency Operations Manager Preliminary
Deputy Secretary of Highway
Administration
Complete

Operations manager with a multidicplinary
team

AASHTO

Consultant- Volpe center

Best practices assessment

Texas

Deputy executive director

Preliminary-bridges

TxDot methodologyfor bridges and
Senior staff members and bridge personnel AASHTO

Vermont

Maintenance Program Engineer

Nothing formal yet

N/A

Preliminary

Focus on noteworthy and impact on
Executive Management Program Managers nation

Oregon
Pennsylvania

Wyoming

Assistant Chief Engineer -Operations
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N/A

STATE DOT SURVEY - HPMS

Question
State

Iowa
New Mexico

To what extent has your Dot conducted VA?
The highway and Modal divisions have determined the iowa critical
transportation assets. the assets include highway and railroad bridges,
commercial points and major river facilities
VA based on AASHTO-- modified to include non transportation assets
Complete, used AASHTO Methodology

Colorado
Puerto Rico

contact Mr. Samuel Forestier, SForestier@act.dtop.gov.pr

Rhode Island

unable to find anyone familiar with VA

Mississippi
South Dakota

VA has been completed and given to AASHTO, FEMA and USDOT
Nothing Formal, discussed critical bridges and infrastructure with
emergency management staff

New Hampshire

Preliminary, Bridges

Pennsylvania

With the help of a consultant, developed the “Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania Enhanced All-Hazard Mitigation Plan.”

Delaware

Used a consultant to train staff on AASHTO methodology

Utah

N/A
Preliminary, used a consultant

Minnesota
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HPMS CONTACTS
Colorado
Delaware
Iowa
Minnesota
Mississippi
New Hampshire
New Mexico
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Utah

Christopher.Robbins@dot.state.co.us
elbert.hunt@dot.state.co.us
Sbhai@mail.dot.state.de.us
Michael.Clement@dot.iowa.gov
Raymond.Callahan@dot.iowa.gov
Sonia.Pitt@dot.state.mn.us
elizabeth.hartmann@dot.state.mn.us
jely@mdot.state.ms.us
BFarrington@dot.state.nh.us
Antonio.Abeyta@nmshtd.state.nm.us
lheltebrid@state.pa.us
SForestier@act.dtop.gov.pr
jbucci@dot.state.ri.us
Mike.Durick@state.sd.us
gkuhl@utah.gov

Chris Robbins
Elbert Hunt
Subash Bhai
Michael Clement
Raymond Callahan
Sonia Pitt
Elizabeth Hartmann
Jeff Ely
Bruce Farrington
Antonio Abeya
Laine A. Heltebridle
Samuel Forestier
Joseph Bucci
Mike Durick
Gary Khul

AASHTO CONTACTS
Arkansas
Connecticut
Georgia
Kansas
Maryland
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
North Dakota
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Texas
Vermont
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Ruth.Foggo@arkansashighways.com
David.Kilpatrick@po.state.ct.us
Stephen.Henry@dot.state.ga.us
Ilkirmse@agtop.state.ks.us
Jaci@ksdot.org
jgeckle@sha.state.md.us
Don.Hillis@modot.mo.gov
jhyatt@mt.gov
jschmail@dor.state.ne.us
jsouba@dot.state.nv.us
David.Albright@nmshtd.state.nm.us
pgavin@dot.state.ny.us
mfery@state.nd.us
Rosemary.M.GENTRY@odot.state.or.us
rgarret@state.pa.us
JALLEY@dot.state.tx.us
Alec.Portalupi@state.vt.us
jeffrey.western@dot.state.wi.us
ken.shultz@dot.statewy.us
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Ruth Foggo
David Kilpatrick
Stephen Henry
Kirmse, Ida
Jaci Vogel
Joseph M. Geckle
Don Hillis
Jim Hyatt
Jim Schmailzl
James R. Souba
David Albright
Paul Gavin
Michael Frey
Rosemary M. Gentry
Robert Garret
Scott Alley
Alec Portalupi
Jeffrey L. Western
Ken Shultz

APPENDIX C – TRANSPORTATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE CHECKLIST (ITE, 2004)

Emergency Transportation Plans

□ My jurisdiction has an emergency transportation plan.
□ The emergency transportation plan has been coordinated with the state and local
organizations in the region.

□ Redundancy of routes and systems is specifically addressed and provided for in
the emergency transportation plan.

The emergency transportation plan includes:

□ Provisions for transportation response to an incident.
□ Plans for alternate and evacuation routes depending on the incident type and
location.

□ Consideration of “all hazards” – chemical, biological, nuclear, etc.
□ Specific actions for each level of the Homeland Security Advisory System.
□ Plans for distributing transportation information to the public.
□ Standard Operating Procedures for basic transportation response activities.

Inter-jurisdictional Cooperation

□ Transportation professionals responsible for emergency preparedness know and
routinely work with emergency response and first responder decision-makers.

□ Transportation professionals responsible for emergency preparedness know and
routinely work with transportation professionals in adjacent jurisdictions.

□ Transportation responders are part of discussions on interoperable
communication issues.
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□ Tabletop exercises are conducted regularly and transportation issues are part of
the discussion.

□ Transportation professionals are included in tabletop exercises conducted by
other responders.

□ Transportation departments have provisions in place for the rapid addition of
operations personnel.

Training and Preparedness

□ Transportation responders are trained in incident command system (ICS) and
unified command system (UCS).

□ Transportation responders are able to communicate with other responders at the
scene via radio, phone or other means.

□ Transportation officials are part of the distribution for intelligence and threat
information.

□ Transportation responders are adequately equipped with protective equipment
and other tools for emergency response.

□ Transportation responders are trained in basic skills for first responders and
hazardous materials response.

Transportation System

□ Information (data, voice, images) from traffic management centers is integrated
and shared with emergency management centers and/or other first responder
centers.

□ GIS and CAD systems used by transportation and other emergency response
professionals are capable of working together and sharing/overlaying data.
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□ Contracts and/or contracting provisions are in place that provide for construction
work under emergency conditions.

□ Construction contracts on key alternate or evacuation routes include provisions
for rapid clearance of work zones in an emergency.

□ Traffic signal systems are coordinated across jurisdictions on key evacuation and
response/recovery routes.

□ Traffic signal timing plans are prepared for evacuation and response scenarios.
□ Traveler information systems are available and prepared for use to communicate
emergency transportation information.

□ Predetermined routes are appropriately signed and support traffic signal timing
plans and information signing.

□ Procedures and policies are in place for sharing of camera control, signal control,
use of officers at intersections, websites, variable message sign control, etc.

□ Traffic management centers include emergency security provisions and
procedures to ensure protection of the center and center personnel.

□ ITS systems are designed for redundancy and to reduce single points of failure.
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